Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining

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**Abstract:** This Article discusses the role of emotions (or feelings or affects) in property rights bargaining. Real world people choose bargaining strategies based upon not only rational calculations, but also their gut feelings. This Article considers the impact of anger and shame on bargaining over property rights and the Coase theorem. Such emotions may depend on beliefs (or expectations or assessments) about whether particular strategic decisions should or will occur. Such beliefs can be viewed as attributions over the intentions of others.

1. Introduction
2. Anger in Property Rights Bargaining
3. Anger and Shame that Depend on Beliefs
4. Applications, Extensions, and Limitations
5. Conclusions

“People are not rational. People are irrational.” Susan Kingsfield.1

“Despair, regret, and tenderness is what I feel for you.” Madonna.2

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1 THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).

2 Madonna, Time Stood Still, on THE NEXT BEST THING soundtrack (Maverick Recording Company 2000).
1. Introduction

The above pair of quotations nicely captures a central thesis of this Article, namely that people do not behave the way that rational actors do because people also feel emotions and those emotions drive behavior. Susan Kingsfield, daughter of the legendary fictional Harvard law professor Kingsfield in the movie The Paper Chase, makes the first statement while arguing with a first-year law student because he is trying to categorize or pigeonhole their budding relationship. In her first sentence, she presumably means that people are not completely rational or only possess bounded rationality. In her next sentence, she presumably does not intend the word irrational to be pejorative, but instead means that people behave unlike how just mere rational actors would. Her position leaves open the question of just what exactly real world humans do that makes them more complicated than simple rational actors. The line from the song by Madonna provides one possible answer: people have feelings towards other people.

The observation that a desire to experience good feelings and to avoid bad feelings motivates human behavior is self-evident upon a moment of introspection. The rational actor model of neoclassical economics reduces all feelings into the concept of utility. The field of law and economics consists of applying the rational actor model of neoclassical microeconomics to analyze legal rules and institutions. Rational actors choose actions that maximize their (in the face of risk, expected) utilities. Neoclassical economics assumes that the preferences of individuals are fixed, or in the language of economics, exogenous. This assumption means that

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3 See generally ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000) (providing an exposition of basic microeconomics with applications to property, contracts, torts, civil procedure, and criminal law); A. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989) (same); see also generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000) (providing a systematic account of constitutional law drawing on the rational actor model, collective or public choice theory, positive political theory, and comparative law and economics).
people’s tastes lie outside the boundaries of economics and lie within the domains of economics’ neighboring disciplines, such as anthropology, psychology, or sociology.5

The standard role that law can play within the rational actor paradigm is to change the constraints that rational actors face.6 But, economics is not a monolithic field of study restricted to purely “rational” emotionless actors.7 More recent economics models explore the phenomena of endogenous preferences.8 Such models recognize another role that law can play, namely changing rational actors’ preferences.9 In fact, people can have a variety of conceivable preferences.10 One view of why classical property theory involves the telling of alternative stories is that narratives can alter the preferences of their listeners.11 Similarly, economists have been viewed as storytellers.12 This idea that preferences of audience members may change from listening to stories is related to another idea: education can also change preferences. There is also evidence suggesting that people who study (neoclassical) economics might behave less cooperatively than others do.13

4 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 10-11 (explaining that economists assume that rational actors maximize some objective function subject to constraints).

5 Id. at 18 (discussing the neoclassical economics assumption of exogenous preferences).


7 Peter H. Huang, Dangers of Monetary Commensurability: A Psychological Game Model of Contagion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1712, 1721 (observing that economics is a language and there are numerous dialects within that language).

8 Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 87-90 (1998) (discussing the construal effects of markets).

9 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14-22, 32-37 (explaining how law can shape preferences and distinguishing between criminal and tort law).

10 Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 43-48 (1990) (providing a thought experiment involving scenarios of six types of preferences that people might have).

11 Id. at 39-40, 55-57 (suggesting that storytelling has the power to change preferences from narrowly conceived self-interest to more cooperative preferences).

12 George A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales 5-6 (1984) (discussing the style of writing that applies concepts from anthropology, psychology, and sociology to economics); Donald McCloskey, If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise (1990) (explaining how economists tell stories to persuade their colleagues, the public, and politicians).

This Article describes people who both reason and feel. The introduction of a survey article on bounded rationality contains quotations from two of Shakespeare’s plays. The first quotation reads: “Hamlet: ‘What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties!’” The second quotation reads: “Puck: ‘Lord, what fools these mortals be!’” The article starts off by stating: “[n]early everyone would see the truth as between Hamlet and Puck. Including Hamlet and Puck. Hamlet is feigning madness, and Puck is just being, well, puckish. Model-writing economists, however, tend not to the middle but to the “infinite in faculties” extreme.” The starting premise of this Article is that real world people care more about emotions in bargaining over property rights than do the unemotional inhabitants of neoclassical rational actor models. There is ample recent experimental evidence supporting this position. Indeed, some economists argue that such behavior is evolutionarily stable. This Article investigates the implications of emotions in bargaining for property law.

This Article proposes a more realistic conception of human behavior than neoclassical rational actor models do by including emotional considerations in strategic decision-making over

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15 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, II.2.319.
16 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHTS DREAM, III.3.116.
17 Conlisk, supra note 14, at 669.
property rights. It, however, is not the first to do so. Management scholars recognize the importance of emotional considerations in bargaining. One view of emotions is they are irrational or non-rational and so they can not be captured within a cost-benefit model. Emotions are viewed as an additional impetus for why rationality must be bounded. According to such a perspective, such emotions as fear and anger disrupt normal rational thought and reasoning capabilities. On the other hand, there is neuro-psychological evidence that emotions help people make better decisions. Also, emotions may be related to reproductive success. Finally, there is a large psychological literature finding that positive affect or feeling good significantly affects decision-making. Incorporating this fundamental insight into an economic

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19 J. KEITH MURNIGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES: A NEW APPROACH TO STRATEGIC THINKING IN NEGOTIATIONS 47-66 (1992) (discussing the role of emotions in bargaining, stressing how such emotions as anger can lead to rash negotiations).


21 Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 139 (1999) (arguing that extremes in emotional arousal provide a source of bounded rationality in addition to such constraints on human cognition as limited computational ability or selective memory and perception).


25 Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 261, 267-74 (Michael Lewis & Jeanette M. Haviland eds., 2d ed. 1999) (surveying these findings); Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect Facilitates Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1122 (1987) (finding that positive affect from getting a small bag of candy or watching a few minutes of a comedy film improved experimental subjects’ performance on tasks that are viewed as requiring creative ingenuity); Alice M. Isen & Paula F. Levin, Effect of Feeling Good On Helping: Cookies and Kindness, 21 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1972) (finding that feeling good from getting cookies while studying in a library or finding a dime in a pay phone increased experimental subjects’ willingness to help); Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in INTUITIVE JUDGMENT: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman eds., forthcoming 2000).
model with completely rational actors explains a diverse range of previously inexplicable behavior.  

There is a currently renewed interest among economists to incorporate emotions into the rational actor model and strategic decision making. In some of these models, emotions act to ensure the credibility of threats. In those models, the intensities of emotions are exogenously fixed. But, there is experimental evidence that people who cooperate feel strong negative emotions towards those who free ride with the intensity of such emotions being stronger the more free riders deviate from a group norm.

Legal scholars are increasingly employing game theory to analyze legal institutions and rules. For example, game theory provides an explanation of why women seem to fare worse than men do when it comes to acquiring and owning property. This Article considers how two

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27 Elster, supra note 20, at 48, 73 (1998) (providing a survey of how emotions can help understand human behavior for which good explanations are lacking and emphasizing the dual role of emotions in shaping choices and rewards); See generally JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS (1999) (studying the similarities and differences between emotion and addiction).

28 Robert H. Frank, A Theory of Moral Sentiment, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 71, 75 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990) (explaining how certain emotions described by Adam Smith as moral sentiments, such as anger, envy, greed, shame, and remorse can assist humans in solving commitment problems).

29 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000) (reporting on findings in public good experiments that people heavily punish free riders even when punishment is costly for punishers and provides no material benefits to punishers).


particular emotions, namely those of anger and shame can affect bargaining over property rights. Obviously, many other emotions can also influence the process and outcome of negotiations.32

The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Section 2 considers anger that is due to self-centered inequity aversion. Section 3 considers anger that depends on beliefs about strategic behavior regarding complying with fairness norms. It also considers shame that depends on attributions about strategic behavior. Sections 2 and 3 contain extremely stylized and simple two-player games. Section 4 discusses how emotions change the received wisdom that bargaining over property rights after nuisance trials invariably results in efficient outcomes. It also discusses other possible applications, extensions, and limitations of psychological emotions. Section 5 offers concluding thoughts.

2. Anger in Property Rights Bargaining

Neoclassical law and economics usually assumes that people are motivated solely by their individual wealth and policymakers evaluate alternative social allocations only by aggregate wealth, not its distribution.33 In practice, however, people often feel anger over the allocation of property rights. Anger can arise due to preferences over consequences in terms of their distribution effects. There is experimental evidence that many people prefer fair or equitable outcomes because they care about not just absolute payoffs, but also relative payoffs and get angry if relative payoffs differ too much.34 Additional survey evidence reveals that firms’ internal

wage structures are constrained by relative payoff considerations. There is empirical evidence that people’s comparison income given their socio-economic characteristics has a large and significant negative effect on their overall job satisfaction, holding everything else constant and more relevantly, so do other people’s wages. Recent models involving people making relative comparisons or exhibiting self-centered inequity aversion are consistent with these findings. Inequity aversion is termed self-centered if a person is more averse to inequity that is disadvantageous to that person than to inequity that is advantageous to that person (and disadvantageous to others).

An example of how self-centered inequity aversion can generate anger is aptly illustrated by considering ultimatum games. In an ultimatum game, there are two players: a divider and an acceptor. The divider moves first and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player by proposing a particular division of some given amount of money between the pair of players. The amount of money at stake is analogous to a fixed cake. An ultimatum game is then simply a cake division problem. For example, if the amount is $10, the divider proposes to keep some amount $D and the other player receives $10 - D where D is a number in the range of zero to $10, including both extremes. If the other player accepts this division, they get paid accordingly. If the other player rejects the proposed offer, they each get nothing.

Standard game theory predicts that an ultimatum game has a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: the divider proposes $9.99 for her and one penny for the other player and the other player accepts. The intuition for only restricting attention to game-theoretic equilibria that are subgame-perfect is to rule out behavior that is not sequentially rationally. Game-theoretic equilibria that are not subgame-perfect entail behavior that is inconsistent over time because such equilibria involve threats or promises that are not in the best interests of those making them earlier to carry out later. In formal terms, such equilibria are also not renegotiation-proof, meaning that players would want to renegotiate their behavior once the game unfolds. In the ultimatum game, the second player may threaten to reject a penny but will not do that if called upon to do so because one penny still exceeds nothing assuming that player only cares about money.

But, a large body of experimental evidence on ultimatum bargaining games finds that such predictions are descriptively false because players agree on an equal instead of unequal division of monetary payoffs. These undisputed empirical findings have nonetheless led to disputes over their interpretation and robustness. But, such results continue to hold in many variants of the above basic ultimatum game. This evidence that equality plays a role in ultimatum games

39 Reinhard Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games, 4 INTL J. GAME THEORY 25, 32-33 (1975) (defining a subgame perfect equilibrium of a game); Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 155-56 (1978) (providing an example of how the criterion of subgame perfection eliminates behavior that is not sequentially rational).


41 See, e.g. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 487, 498-501 (discussing alternative theories consistent with such findings and concluding that people’s preferences depend on such non-monetary factors as fairness).

42 See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 38 at 1097-1105 (reporting such results); Murnighan, supra note 19, at 103-21 (discussing such variants of the ultimatum game as dividing a melting ice cream cake); Jack Ochs & Alvin E.
persists even if the monetary stakes are high.\textsuperscript{43} Similar experimental results hold in related bargaining games involving property rights.\textsuperscript{44}

So, what explains the observed behavior in experimental games? One possibility is proposers’ concerns with fairness. To test this explanation, researchers ran dictator games, that involve one player dictating how to divide a fixed sum of money that the other player cannot refuse. In other words, the first player dictates how to divide the cake. Experimental tests reject the proposer-fairness hypothesis.\textsuperscript{45} None of several other hypotheses involving proposer-fairness predicted all of the results in ultimatum games.\textsuperscript{46} So, proposers’ concerns with fairness alone cannot explain observed behavior in ultimatum games. Although the results of experimental dictator and ultimatum games clearly indicate that proposers both exhibit and anticipate that others expect them to exhibit what are termed other regarding preferences (ORPs), these are not sufficient to explain observed experimental results. Additionally, ORPs depend on context and may vary with demographic characteristics, like gender.\textsuperscript{47}

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Roth, \textit{An Experimental Study of Sequential Games}, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 368 tbl. 6, 376, 378-80 (1989) (reporting and explaining experimental evidence finding that fairness matters).
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\textsuperscript{43} Lisa Cameron, \textit{Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia}, 37 ECON. INQUIRY, 47 (1999) (reporting on such experiments); Robert Slonin & Alvin Roth, \textit{Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic}, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569, 573, 588 fig. 3A (1998) (finding that raising the aggregate stakes from $10 to $100 to more than one week’s income in a poor country does not have much effect, but very high stakes with repeated play does have some effect).
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\textsuperscript{44} Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, & Vernon Smith, \textit{Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games}, 7 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 346, 370-71 (1994) (providing support for the proposition that offers in such games are motivated by strategic and expectation considerations instead of an autonomous and private preference for equity); Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe, & Vernon Smith, \textit{On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games}, 25 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 289, 291, 297 (1996) (same).
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In contrast, fairness preferences on the part of responders, formalized in a model of self-centered inequity aversion, accounts for the observed experimental results in ultimatum games.\textsuperscript{48} Envy or spite provides another potential explanation for the behavior that is observed in experimental ultimatum bargaining games.\textsuperscript{49} Yet another explanation for the observed behavior in ultimatum games is that inequality triggers another emotion, namely anger. In other words, one may exhibit a taste for justice or fairness because others will feel anger over injustice and that anger can lead to expressive and individually and socially costly acts (such as rejecting positive offers in ultimatum games).\textsuperscript{50} This means that you want your partners and your agents to feel such anger over how others beside yourself behave towards them to the extent their well-being is tied to yours. Thus, people who feel such anger provide a public good to some others. Of course, for a positive spillover to exist, it is important that people have a shared sense of justice. But, if your partners and your agents feel anger upon being treated unfairly, then it also means that you will suffer the wrath of their anger if you misbehave towards them.

If people feel anger when a divider violates a norm of equality and dividers expect others to experience such anger, then dividers, in their own self-interest, should not violate the norm of equality. There is experimental evidence that people feel differently towards inequality that is randomly generated versus inequality that is the result of somebody choosing to make uneven

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\textsuperscript{48} Bolton & Ockenfels, \textit{supra} note 38, at 173-75; Fehr & Schmidt, \textit{supra} note 38, at 825-28.
\textsuperscript{49} Georg Kirchsteiger, \textit{The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games}, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 379-87 (1993) (providing theoretical models involving envy that can explain the observed behavior from ultimatum bargaining experiments); David K. Levine, \textit{Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments}, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593, 600-604 (1998) (offering a theoretical model with players having preferences that are linear in the money incomes of themselves and others that is consistent with results of experimental ultimatum games); Vai-Lam Mui, \textit{The Economics of Envy}, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311, 317-31 (1995) (modeling how envy interacts with legal institutions to determine the level of innovation, retaliation, sabotage, and sharing).
\textsuperscript{50} Thanks to Bob Cooter for making this observation and the following two points.
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offers.\textsuperscript{51} Models incorporating social comparisons into people’s utility functions can still fail to distinguish between these different sources of inequality.\textsuperscript{52} Additionally, if the absence of equality was unexpected, the degree of anger experienced is greater; this is an example of an emotion that depends upon beliefs about behavior. Such belief-dependent emotions are formally captured by psychological game theory.\textsuperscript{53}

The distinguishing and novel feature of psychological games is that emotional responses to strategic decisions are determined endogenously. Such emotional responses are determined in equilibrium in light of beliefs about strategic decisions. It helps to distinguish between two categories of emotions: emotions that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior and those that do not. Emotions that are independent of beliefs about strategic behavior can easily be incorporated into extensive form game trees by changing some (possibly several) player’s terminal payoffs or into strategic form games by altering some (possibly several) player’s payoffs. But, emotions that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior cannot be handled in such a manner if the beliefs that such emotions depend on are to correspond to strategic decisions endogenously determined in a game-theoretic equilibrium. If players’ beliefs about appropriate strategic behavior can be arbitrary, then emotions that depend on such beliefs are functionally equivalent to emotions that are independent of beliefs. If players’ beliefs over appropriate strategic behavior are not arbitrary, but must instead correspond to strategies actually chosen in equilibrium, then such emotions will not be functionally equivalent to emotions that are independent of beliefs about


\textsuperscript{52} Bolton, supra note 38 at 1109-13 (1991) (providing a formal model of players making relative comparisons, but not differentiating between a distaste for uneven allocations from a willingness to punish others who have behaved unfairly by proposing uneven offers).

\textsuperscript{53} See John D. Geanakoplos, David Pearce, \& Ennio Stacchetti, \textit{Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality}, 1 \textit{Games \& Econ. Behav.} 60, 65, 70-74 (1989) (providing the original definitions of psychological games); Van
strategic behavior. The condition that players' beliefs about strategic behavior correspond to actual strategic behavior requires that players have rational expectations or fulfilled beliefs. Emotions can be in response to not only actions or outcomes, but also attributions or beliefs about intentions.

Consider the game depicted in Figure 1. This is a discrete version of the ultimatum games discussed above. In Figure 1, A’s payoffs are the first number in each pair, while B’s payoffs are the second number in each pair. In this game, A can either maintain the status quo or make a proposal to engage in some joint venture or transaction, that makes both A and B better off, but A to a larger degree than B. If the payoffs are in dollars, this just means A receives more cash than B. If the payoffs are in utilities, then A enjoys a higher utility than B. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is for A to propose and for B to accept because B is better off than rejecting the uneven division. In Figure 1, B may threaten to reject this uneven offer, but if there is common knowledge of payoffs and players' rationality, such a threat is not credible to A.

**Figure 1: Unemotional Bargaining Over Property Rights**

The game in Figure 1 is easily modified to capture the intuition that people (especially role B players) may get angry out of self-centered inequity aversion. Consider the modified version of this game in Figure 2. This game simply decreases the B’s payoff from accepting the inequitable offer from 3 to 3-N, where N represents the anger suffered from accepting such an offer. Not surprisingly, if N is less than 2, B suffers anger but not enough to reject the offer. But, if N is larger than 2, B suffers enough anger to reject the offer. If N = 2, B is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the uneven split. Finally, N = 0 reproduces the no anger case. Assuming N is common knowledge amongst the players means that A knows how angry B will get and so can act accordingly. This method of incorporating anger formulates emotions as a form of psychic cost that can be incorporated into utilities. Emotions do not impair cognitive abilities in this framework. The anger captured by the variable N is exogenous to the model and is also independent of players’ beliefs.

**Figure 2: Anger in Bargaining over Property Rights**

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A
  /
/  \
Don't Propose
  /
(2,2)
  /
B
/  \
Reject Accept
  /
(1,1)
  /
(4, 3-N)
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3. Anger and Shame that Depend on Beliefs

Psychological evidence suggests that how much anger one feels in a given situation may depend not just on outcomes, but also on attributions of intentions. In other words, the same outcome can generate different levels of anger, depending on beliefs about the intentions of the other party. Thus, the utility that one feels in response to another’s choice often depends on what other choices that other person could have made. In particular, if that other person had no choice an unequal outcome might produce less anger than if they had many other choices.

A recent experiment demonstrates that identical offers in four mini-ultimatum games produce systematically different acceptance rates depending on the other choices that proposers had. In each of the four games, proposers must divide 10 points between themselves and responders. Proposers always faced two choices, the first being to propose 8 for proposers and 2 for responders. Proposers’ other choice was respectively in game 1, an even split of 5; in game 2, 2 for proposers and 8 for responders; in game 3, 8 for proposers and 2 for responders (that is, no real choice for proposers); and in game 4, 10 for proposers and 0 for responders. Rejection rates of the offer of 8 for proposers and 2 for responders were 44.4% in game 1, 26.7% in game 2, 18% in game 3, and 8.9% in game 4. In addition, the percentage of proposers choosing to make the offer of 8 for proposers and 2 for responders and the acceptance rates of responders to such proposals both monotonically increase from game 1 to game 2 to game 4 (remember there is no

55 Blount, supra note 51 at 142-43 (discussing experimental findings that subjects punish unfair strategic behavior instead of reject inequality).
57 Id. at Figure 2.
These results demonstrate that players care about not only the distribution of material outcomes, but also the other alternatives that other players have. While these results could be just choice-set effects, they might show that other players’ intentions matter. This interpretation is plausible upon realizing that whether a given action is attributed as kind or unkind depends on the range of other possible actions that were not chosen, beliefs over what actions would or should be taken, and social norms.

The idea that intentions, not just outcomes, matter is of course a familiar one in law. Intentions often distinguish between whether the same action is a tort or a crime and whether a tort should involve punitive damages. Similar distinctions occur in criminal law in terms of the requisite mental state or culpability for each material element of an offense being action that is taken purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Another example of where intentions matter in criminal law is the same action of killing another human being has different legal consequences depending on whether that act is committed with pre-meditation or in self-defense. Intentions are also related to a notion of reciprocity in which people punish unkind actions and reward kind actions.

In particular, anger can also be induced by beliefs that other people should follow certain social fairness norms when they do not do so. Recently, legal scholars have stressed the

58 Id. at Figure 3.
59 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming, 2000) (demonstrating the powerful implications of reciprocity for labor market interactions, contributions to public goods, and enforcing incomplete contracts and social norms).
60 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)-(2).
importance of social norms in affecting behavior.\(^{63}\) An interpretation of norms is they are beliefs about what should or will be done in certain interactions.\(^{64}\) This section builds on that view by suggesting that someone not complying with certain social norms can trigger anger in others.

This section considers two particular fairness norms, that of equality and that of equity. An equality fairness norm expresses a belief that, other things being equal, a fair division involves no party to a bargain receiving a higher or lower payoff than any other party. In other words, a fair outcome involves payoffs that are equal across parties. Violating an equality norm can result in anger or disappointment, which can in turn cause bargaining impasses or breakdowns and noncompliance with mutually agreed upon resolutions or joint ventures. Many economic and psychological experiments reveal that people have deep-rooted beliefs in equality norms.\(^{65}\)

Recall that the distinguishing feature of a psychological game is that at least one player’s utility depends not only directly on the strategies that players choose, but also directly on some

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beliefs about appropriate or expected strategic behavior. A psychological equilibrium is a set of strategies and beliefs about strategic behavior that satisfy two conditions. First, the strategies are best responses to each other. Second, the beliefs about strategic behavior correspond to actual strategic behavior. The first requirement is the defining property of a non-psychological (Nash) equilibrium. The second is a condition that beliefs about strategic behavior are correct. This section applies the structure of psychological games to the setting of bargaining over property rights to understand how emotions can affect bargaining over property rights.

Psychological games have been applied in previous work to model decisions to sue, settle, or proceed to trial in litigation. Psychological games can incorporate fairness notions into models of economic phenomena like pricing decisions by a monopolist and welfare economics. Psychological games also demonstrate how guilt can mitigate the problem of malfeasance in principal-agent relationships. Experimental evidence is consistent with a psychological game-theoretic model of guilt. A general theory of sequential reciprocity that is based on psychological games has applications to ultimatum games and sequential prisoners’ dilemmas.

A single formal theory of reciprocity based on psychological games explains the stylized findings

66 John Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 48, 49 (1950) (defining and proving existence of a Nash equilibrium).
68 Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284-90, 1292-96 (1993) (developing a normal or strategic form psychological game-theoretic models involving fairness and applying them to monopoly pricing and welfare economics).
69 Huang & Wu, supra note 64, at 392-401 (providing formal models of the role that guilt can play in maintaining social order and controlling corruption in principal-agent-supervisor relationships).
in many experimental games, including ultimatum games, dictator games, market games, and public goods games.\textsuperscript{72}

In psychological games, the impact of anger on payoffs depends on endogenously determined equilibrium beliefs about behavior. The less likely that a party believes that it is going to be offered the smaller part of an unequal division, the more anger that party will suffer if such an offer is made. Conversely, the more likely a party believes that it will be offered the lesser share of an unequal division, the less anger it will suffer if such an offer is made. In contrast with the anger in game in figure 2, anger that depends upon beliefs about behavior, although lowering the payoff to the party that receives the smaller portion, does not necessarily reduce it sufficiently to induce that party to reject all such offers. Anger that depends upon beliefs about behavior thus captures the phenomenon of a party not always accepting nor always rejecting a given offer, but instead choosing to accept such offers sometimes and reject them at other times, depending on their beliefs. This variation in behavior is due to the multiplicity of self-confirming beliefs about what is to or should be offered.

Consider Figure 3, depicting the simplest psychological game-theoretic model of the above situation, involving the potential for anger on the part of a player receiving the smaller share of some monetary stakes. In each pair of payoffs in Figure 3, the first number is A's payoff, while the second number is B's payoff. The payoffs are in terms of individual utilities, inclusive of emotional considerations. If A does not make an offer, suppose the status quo payoffs are 2 for A and 2 for B. If A makes a skewed offer to B and B rejects the offer, suppose that both A's payoff and B's payoff decrease from 2 to 1 due to the foregone opportunity cost of resources used in

bargaining. If A makes a skewed offer to B and B accepts A's offer, suppose that material payoffs are 4 for A and 3 for B. Let p denote the probability that A does not make a skewed offer. Then, \((1 - p)\) is the probability that A makes the skewed offer. Let q denote the probability that B rejects the offer. Then, \((1 - q)\) is the probability that B accepts A's offer. Let r denote B's expectation of p. For this to be a psychological game, B's non-material and total payoffs from accepting a skewed offer depend on r, B's beliefs over A not making the skewed offer. For simplicity, assume this dependence is linear. In particular, note B will reject the skewed offer, whenever 1 is larger than \((3 - 3r)\), or r is larger than \(2/3\). Similarly, in order for B to accept A's offer, \((3 - 3r)\) must be larger than 1, or \(2/3\) must be greater than r.

**Figure 3:**
*Anger That Depends on Beliefs About an Equality Norm*

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{A} & \text{Not Offer} & \text{Make Offer} \\
\text{p} & (2, 2) & (1 - p) \\
\text{B} & \text{Reject} & \text{Accept} \\
\text{q} & (1, 1) & (4, 3 - 3r) \\
\end{array}
\]

Note: \(r = \text{B's Exp of } p\)

This game has three psychological equilibria that are subgame-perfect, namely two pure ones, \((p, q) = (1, 1)\) and \((p, q) = (0, 0)\) and a mixed one \((p, q) = (1/2, 2/3)\).

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In the first equilibrium, B expects A will not make a skewed offer, thus were A to make such a skewed offer, the belief-dependent anger, r, suffered by B would be big enough to cause B to reject the offer. In a psychological equilibrium, B has rational expectations, meaning that r equals p, or r equals 1. B's payoff for accepting the offer is reduced to 3 - 3(1), or 0; while by assumption, B's payoff for rejecting A's offer is 1. So, B would choose reject such a skewed offer, and thus A will not make such an offer in the first place.

In the second equilibrium, B expects A to make the skewed offer, thus when A makes that skewed offer, B does not feel that any anger towards A for doing so. In equilibrium r has to equal p, equating r to 0. B’s payoff for accepting the skewed offer increases to an unemotional level of 3; while, B's payoff for rejecting A’s offer is by assumption 1. So, B accepts the skewed offer and A chooses to make the skewed offer.

In the third, mixed strategy equilibrium, A makes the skewed offer 2/3 of the time and B rationally expects this, while B accepts the skewed offer 2/3 of the time.73

This example demonstrates how beliefs about strategic behavior determine which one of three possible equilibria is realized. Had B expected A to propose an unequal division, B would accept such an offer, and so, A would choose to make such an offer. On the other hand, had A realized that B had not expected an unequal offer, then A would have not have make a skewed offer. Therefore, this psychological game highlights the important role of beliefs over whether a particular fairness norm should apply in this particular bargaining situation. In a negotiation between “equals”, for example, Bs may reject skewed offers and therefore A’s may not make skewed offers. In contrast, when A is a powerful position relative to B or alternatively when B is known to be likely to expect and accept skewed offers, A is likely to make a skewed offer.
The multiplicity of equilibria also provides a role for law to serve as a focal point in selecting among multiple equilibria. But, whether the law actually coordinates expectations depends on such other factors as whether the law is perceived to be just. For example, civil disobedience of a law will often occur if that law is perceived to be morally wrong. An open question in general is under what conditions do emotions that depend on beliefs arise? In the context of property rights bargaining, when is there belief-dependent anger? In particular, suppose that in figure 3 that A must decide whether to be an adverse possessor on B’s land (corresponding to making a skewed offer) or not (corresponding to not making a skewed offer). That a sense of entitlement is not always part of legal possession is aptly illustrated by the legal doctrine of adverse possession. Initially, an adverse possessor has no legal entitlement to land the adverse possessor is on. If the adverse possessor satisfies certain requirements, the adverse possessor becomes the legal owner of that land. But, none of these requirements concern the adverse possessor’s intentions. Yet, there is empirical evidence that judges and juries view trespassers as never becoming legally or morally entitled to adversely possessed land. Thus, the answer to the question of when does an individual get angry if property is taken away or not given to that individual can depend on many subjective factors.

73 For A to be indifferent between making and not making a skewed offer, it must be that 2 = q + 4(1 - q), or q = 2/3. For B to indifferent between rejecting and accepting a skewed offer, it must be that 1 = (3 – 3r), or r = 2/3. Because B is required to have rational expectations in a psychological equilibrium, p = r = 2/3.

74 Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 J. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2000) (suggesting also that law can provide focal points for coordination of individual behavior).

75 Huang & Wu, supra note 64, at 404 (suggesting that laws that are perceived to be fair and just become internalized as social norms that create decentralized order in societies).

76 Thanks to Carol Rose for suggesting this example.

77 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 413-14 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the doctrine of adverse possession).

78 Richard H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 337-49, 358 (1983) (finding in a survey of cases decided between 1966 and 1983 that courts are likelier to apply the rule of adverse possession when the initial trespass was not intended). But see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 23-37 (1986) (debating the exact role subjective intent has played in decided adverse possession case); Richard H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 65, 61-75, 82-97 (1986) (same); Roger A. Cunningham, More on Adverse Possession: A Rejoinder to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1167, 1172-83 (1986) (same).
Anger that depends on beliefs about strategic behavior can also arise in response to violations of another fairness norm, namely that of equity. This norm expresses a belief that, ceteris paribus, an equitable division occurs when parties get different payoffs that are proportional to their contribution, knowledge, or status quo payoffs. Studies by economists and social psychologists offer empirical support for the proposition that people care about equity in relationships.79 Social psychologists have suggested a general theory of equity in human relationships.80 This theory has profound implications for welfare economics and such macroeconomic phenomena as wage stickiness and internal labor markets.81 Compliance with or violations of equity norms is illustrated by modifying Figure 3.

Consider the psychological game in Figure 4, involving anger if a norm of equity is violated. In each pair of payoffs in Figure 4, the first number is A's payoff, while the second number is B's payoff. The payoffs are in terms of individual utilities, inclusive of emotional considerations. If A does not make an offer, suppose the status quo payoffs are 1 for A and 4 for B. Assume that B considers this to be equitable. If A makes a skewed offer to B and B rejects the offer, suppose that both A's payoff and B's payoffs decrease by 1 due to the foregone opportunity cost of resources used in bargaining. If A makes a skewed offer to B and B accepts A's offer, suppose that material payoffs are 5 for A and 5 for B. Let p denote the probability that A does not make an inequitable offer. Then, (1 - p) is the probability that A offers B an inequitable division of payoffs. Let q be the probability that B rejects the offer. Then, (1 - q) is the probability that B accepts A's offer. Let r denote B's expectation of p. For this to be a

psychological game, B's non-material and total payoffs from accepting an offer perceived to be inequitable depend on r, B's beliefs over A not making the inequitable offer. For simplicity, assume this dependence is linear. In particular, note B rejects the inequitable offer, whenever 3 is larger than (5 - 3r), or r is larger than 2/3. Similarly, in order for B to accept A's offer, (5 - 3r) must be larger than 3, or 2/3 must be greater than r.

**Figure 4:**
**Anger That Depends on Beliefs About an Equity Norm**

This psychological game has three psychological equilibria, that are subgame-perfect, namely two pure ones, (p, q) = (1, 1) and (p, q) = (0, 0) and a mixed one (p, q) = (2/3, 4/5).

In the first equilibrium, B expects A not to make B an inequitable offer; thus, were A to make the inequitable offer, B experiences belief-dependent anger great enough to cause B to reject such an offer. Because in a psychological equilibrium, expectations are rational, r = p and so, r = 1. B's payoff from accepting the offer is 5 - 3(1), or 2; while, B's payoff for rejecting A's offer is 3. Hence, B would reject A's offer were A to make one and so, A will not make such an inequitable offer in the first place.
In the second equilibrium, B expects A to make B an inequitable offer. Thus, if A makes an inequitable offer, B experiences no anger. In equilibrium \( r = p \), or \( r = 0 \). B's payoff from accepting such an offer increases to an unemotional level of 5; while, B's payoff for rejecting such an offer is assumed to be 3. Thus, B would accept such an inequitable offer were A to make one and so, A makes such an offer.

In the third, mixed strategy equilibrium, A makes the skewed offer \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the time and B rationally expects this, while B accepts the skewed offer \( \frac{4}{5} \) of the time.\(^{82}\)

This example demonstrates how beliefs over choices determine which of three equilibria is realized. If B expected A to make an inequitable offer, then B would have accepted such an offer, and so, A would choose to make such an offer. On the other hand, if B not expected an inequitable offer, then B would reject such an offer, and thus, A would not make such an offer. So, this psychological game highlights an important role that beliefs over whether a norm of equity does or should apply to a specific bargaining situation can play in selecting among multiple equilibrium outcomes.

Which of the competing norms, that of equality or that of equity prevails in a given situation depends on the context and the players. A possible justification for an unequal division might be B investing four times the resources or effort levels compared to A. In this case, a norm of equity favors a four to one division in favor of B. Thus, this psychological game highlights the important role of beliefs over whether the social norm of equality or equity should prevail in determining behavior. This psychological game-theoretic model also captures the phenomenon of an individual not always accepting nor always rejecting a particular offer, but instead choosing to accept such offers sometimes and reject them at other times. This variation in behavior is caused
by the multiplicity of self-confirming beliefs about what is offered. For example, an equality norm instead of an equity norm can seem more appropriate if proposers are randomly determined than when proposers earned that role in some non-random manner. Experimental evidence finds that uneven division is offered less frequently and rejected more frequently when the role of proposer is randomly assigned than when that role is based upon better performance on a quiz or in another game. This suggests that the perceived legitimacy of authority can play a significant role in determining the behavior of both the authority and those subject to authority.

Next, we analyze how shame can influence behavior in ultimatum-like games. The amount of shame that an individual named A experiences often depends on A’s beliefs about another's beliefs about A’s actions. For example, consider the issue of men and women sharing a restaurant bill on a date. Imagine that a particular man offers to split a check. The more that he believed that she believed that he was paying, the more ashamed he would feel. In the extreme case if the woman expected with probability one (that is, was confident) the man was paying and says so upon his offer to go “dutch”, the man feels maximal shame. The less that he believed that she believed that he was paying, the less ashamed he would feel. In the extreme case if she expected with probability one (that is, was confident) they were going “dutch” and says so upon his offer to do so, the man feels no shame.

82 For A to be indifferent between making and not making a skewed offer, it must be that $1 = 0q + 5(1 - q)$, or $q = 4/5$. For B to indifferent between rejecting and accepting a skewed offer, it must be that $3 = (5 - 3r)$, or $r = 2/3$. Because B is required to have rational expectations in a psychological equilibrium, $p = r = 2/3$.

83 Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 65, at 276 tbl. 1, 280-81 (reporting this experimental finding).

84 See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 30-39 (1990) (summarizing and discussing studies relating compliance with the law to feelings of legitimacy and morality of the law); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke L.J. 703, 783-84 (1994) (discussing the psychological basis of Supreme Court legitimacy); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 Int’l J.L. & Pol. 219, 229-30 (1996-1997) (discussing the importance of legitimacy to compliance); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 Swiss J. Econ. & Stat. 219, 224-25 (1997) (reporting on citizen interview studies finding that voluntary compliance with the law is linked to judgments regarding the legitimacy of authorities and morality of the law).
Consider shame that depends on such beliefs over beliefs about strategic behavior in bargaining over property rights. Consider the psychological game in Figure 5. In each pair of payoffs in Figure 5, the first number is A’s payoff, while the second number is B’s payoff. The payoffs are in terms of individual utilities, inclusive of emotional considerations. Suppose the status quo payoffs are 10 for A and 10 for B if A does not make the offer to B. If A makes the offer to B, and B accepts this offer, A’s payoff increases from 10 to 11. Suppose that B’s payoff decreases from 10 to 9 by accepting the offer. A possible scenario is that B has many other property rights already and indeed that is why A made this offer to B, because of B’s apparent expertise in managing all these property rights. Yet, it is precisely due to B’s many already existing property rights that B may not want another property right from A. For example, B may not have the additional resources necessary to fully benefit from this new property right so that accepting this property right means B has to divert resources from B’s existing property rights to deal with the property right in question. Another possible reason why B can be worse off is that B has to deal with the higher level of influence costs generated by this newly acquired property right.\(^{85}\) Both of the above scenarios provide reasons for why B’s payoff decreases, despite B acquiring an otherwise valuable property right.

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\(^{85}\) PAUL R. MILGROM & D. JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT 192-94 (defining influence costs and providing examples of their importance).
If A makes the offer to B and B rejects the offer, then A's payoff decreases from 10 to 9, due to the foregone opportunity cost from not making this offer to some other party during the negotiation process with B. As for B, choosing to reject this new property right is different from never having to deal with it. Let p be the probability that A does not make a particular offer to B. Then, (1 - p) denotes the probability that A does make such an offer to B. Let q be the probability that B rejects A's offer. Then, (1 - q) is the probability that B accepts A's offer. Let r be B's expectation of p. Finally, let s denote B's expectation of A's expectation of q. For this to be a psychological game, B's non-material and total payoffs from accepting A's offer depend on both r, B's beliefs over A not making the offer and s, B's beliefs over A's beliefs over B rejecting the offer. For simplicity, assume this dependence is linear in both of these belief variables.

Thus, B's payoff from rejecting the offer depends on r, B's beliefs about p, and s, B's beliefs about A's beliefs about q. Notice that B's beliefs over A's decision and over A's beliefs over B's decision can be interpreted as B's perception of the legitimacy of A's offer. The
particular specification of B’s payoff to rejecting A’s offer in figure 5 is such that B suffers more
shame from rejecting A’s offer the more B expected A to make the offer and the more that B
expected A expected B to accept the offer.

This game has three psychological equilibria, that are subgame-perfect, namely two pure
ones, \((p, q) = (1, 1)\) and \((p, q) = (0, 0)\) and a mixed one \((p, q) = (1/2, 1/2)\).

In the first equilibrium, B expects A to not make this offer (this is because an equilibrium
requires that \(r = p\) and \(p = 1\)). Thus, were A to make this offer, the belief-dependent shame B
suffers from rejecting is not great enough to cause B to accept A’s offer. Formally, B’s payoff to
rejecting A’s offer reduces to \((9 + s)\). B’s payoff for accepting the offer is 9. Thus, B will be
indifferent between rejecting and accepting the right, if \(s = 0\). But, because, in equilibrium, \(q = s\),
\(s = 0\) implies \(q = 0\), which means that B is not indifferent. To avoid this contradiction, \(q = s > 0\).
But, if \(s > 0\), then \((9 + s) > 9\) which implies that \(q = 1\) and so, \(s = 1\) because in equilibrium \(q = s\).
This means that \(q = 1\) is the best response to \(p = 1\). Clearly, if \(q = 1\), then A’s best response is \(p = 1\).

In the second equilibrium, B expects A to make the offer (this is because an equilibrium
requires that \(r = p\) and \(p = 0\)). Thus, when A makes the offer, the belief-dependent shame B
suffers from rejecting is great enough to cause B to accept A’s offer. Formally, B’s payoff to
rejecting A’s offer reduces to \((8 + s)\), while B’s payoff from accepting A’s offer is 9. So, B
always accepts and \(q = 0\) is B’s best response to \(p = 0\). Clearly, if \(q = 0\), then A's best response is
\(p = 0\).

In the third, mixed strategy equilibrium, A makes the offer 1/2 of the time and B rationally
expects this, while B accepts the offer 1/2 of the time and A expects this.\(^{86}\)

\(^{86}\) For A to be indifferent between making and not making the offer, it must be that \(10 = 9q + 11(1 - q)\), or \(q = 1/2\). Because A is required to have rational expectations in a psychological equilibrium, \(s = q = 1/2\). For B to
These equilibria demonstrate how beliefs over strategic decisions affect which one of the above three equilibria will occur. If B had expected to suffer shame from rejecting A’s offer, then B would have accepted A’s offer, and so, A would make such an offer to B. On the other hand, if B had not expected to suffer shame from rejecting A’s offer, then B would reject such an offer, and thus, A would not make such an offer to B. So, whether shame exists or not has implications for which equilibrium outcome will occur. Finally, the mixed strategy equilibrium entails values of p and q such that A is indifferent between making and not making an offer to B and B is indifferent between rejecting and accepting that offer. Thus, this psychological game demonstrates how the desire to avoid shame can affect equilibrium behavior in bargaining over property rights.

4. Applications, Extensions, and Limitations

The most famous example of the law and economics approach is a proposition due to economist Ronald H. Coase.⁸⁷ Coase received the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics in part for this proposition.⁸⁸ Coase stated that “[I]t is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”⁸⁹ A version of this result is known as the Coase theorem.⁹⁰ A statement of the

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Coase theorem is that “when transactions costs are zero, an efficient use of resources results from private bargaining regardless of the legal assignment of property rights.” This version of the Coase theorem is an efficiency claim. A related but stronger claim is that regardless of the assignment of initial property rights, private bargaining results not only in an efficient outcome, but also in the same outcome. This version of the Coase theorem is an invariance claim. Such a conclusion only holds under the restrictive assumption that there are no wealth effects.

Many law students encounter some version of the Coase theorem in their first year courses on property law, contracts, criminal law, or torts. Indeed, a seminal article in the field of law and economics argued that what distinguishes property from torts or criminal law is the choice between property rules versus liability rules versus inalienability rules and the Coase theorem helps guide the selection among those choices. The Coase theorem has been the subject of many debates. An interesting early debate focused on whether empirical and survey evidence refuted the Coase theorem. An eminent law and economics scholar found the lack of an explicit

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90 George Stigler, 113 The Theory of Price (3d ed. 1966) (naming a version of Coase’s insight as the Coase theorem).
91 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 3, at 85.
93 Regan, supra note 92, at 427 (referring to the second claim of the Coase theorem as the “invariance” thesis because it claims the result of private bargaining does not vary with the assignment of initial property rights).
94 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 85, at 35-38 (1992) (defining wealth effects and stating a version of the Coase theorem when there are no wealth effects).
95 Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1105-10, 1124-25 (1972) (distinguishing between property law and tort law in terms of the difference between property entitlements and liability entitlements and proposing that criminal law prevents converting property and inalienability rules into liability rules). See also Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2178-83 (1997) (suggesting that such distinctions are blurred by the use of examples lurking in the shadows that drive the analysis).
model of bargaining in the original Coase article troubling.\textsuperscript{98} Still other scholars have commented on the Coase theorem from other perspectives.\textsuperscript{99} Numerous critiques of the Coase theorem involve asymmetric information economics; long-run entry; imperfect competition; non-cooperative bargaining under complete information, one-sided incomplete information, and two-sided incomplete information; cooperative game theory; collective action; failures to satisfy convexity assumptions; departures from the neoclassical rational actor model; and prohibitive transactions costs.\textsuperscript{100} The penultimate item from the above list with its focus on endowment effects due to loss aversion or status quo bias is related to a central theme of this conference, that is new and critical approaches to law and economics.\textsuperscript{101} Such insights have important consequences for the Coase theorem.\textsuperscript{102}

Ellickson has questioned the underlying behavioral assumptions of neoclassical law and economics that people bargain over well-defined and enforceable property rights in the shadow of

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\textsuperscript{99} See, e.g., \textit{MILGROM} \& \textit{ROBERTS}, \textit{supra} note 85, at 293-306 (reconsidering the Coase theorem by discussing bounded rationality, property rights that are ill-defined, inalienable, insecure, untradable, or unenforceable, and the ethics of private property).
\textsuperscript{102} Ulen, \textit{supra} note 41, at 516-17 (1994) (summarizing clearly the implications of quasi-rational economics for the Coase theorem).
\end{flushleft}
the law.\textsuperscript{103} He found that in repeated games, people rely on informal social norms, not on formal law, to enforce property rights.\textsuperscript{104} In addition to Ellickson's field studies, asymmetric information models of strategic behavior formally demonstrate that inefficiency is more often than not the result of bargaining.\textsuperscript{105} Experimental tests of the Coase theorem find that subjects reach efficient outcomes, but sometimes unevenly divide those outcomes between two and three players.\textsuperscript{106} Similar findings result in larger groups of players.\textsuperscript{107} The Coase theorem even holds if experimental subjects bargain over monetary payments for drinking a distasteful liquid.\textsuperscript{108} Further experimental tests of the Coase theorem suggests that people are more likely to accept uneven divisions if they believe those with the right to a larger share earned that right.\textsuperscript{109} Earning such a right can thus change beliefs over behavior as in psychological games. Experimental evidence supports the intuition that people in the real world are just as, if not even more, concerned over

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Ellickson, \textit{supra} note 63, at 538, 539-41 (1998) (explaining how more recent law and economics recognizes the importance of social norms); Ellickson, \textit{supra} note 33, at 23, 24-26 (1989) (criticizing neoclassical law and economics for not incorporating social norms).
\item Elizabeth Hoffman \& Matthew L. Spitzer, \textit{The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests}, 25 J.L. \& ECON. 73, 82 (1982) (reporting 89.5\% of two- and three-person bargaining experiments resulted in efficient outcomes, but only 62 of those resulted in even division).
\item Hoffman \& Spitzer, \textit{supra} note 83, at 276 tbl. 1, 280-81 (1985) (reporting and discussing experimental results for games exploring two methods for making players tolerate uneven division, namely earning the right to control the division versus winning that right in the simple game of skill known as Nim).
\end{enumerate}
the fairness or equity of allocations of property rights than over the Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks

Although Coase said nothing about the division of surplus, the clever experiments
described above provide general support for the efficiency aspect of the Coase theorem. But,
their very stylized nature raises the question of whether the same outcomes would occur in the
real world with less controlled and more complicated situations.\footnote{Id. at 552-53 (describing this experiment).} A real-world experiment
designed and conducted for other purposes also provides a test of the Coase theorem.\footnote{Id. at 553-56 (explaining more details of this experiment).} The state of Illinois ran this experiment to determine if bonus payments to workers or their employers
can reduce the amount of time that unemployed workers remain on unemployment
compensation.\footnote{Id. at 555, 569-91 (discussing the results of this experiment).} The results of this experiment conflict with the predictions of the Coase
theorem regarding efficiency of the outcome and invariance of the allocation of resources.

Another real-world empirical study of twenty nuisance cases found that bargaining did not
occur between the parties after judgment in any of the cases.\footnote{Id. at 552 (questioning the applicability to real-world conditions of experimental evidence supporting the Coase theorem).} Most introductions to the Coase
theorem in the first year of law school property (and contract) law course suggest that such post-
judgment bargaining does occur if transactions costs are low. One possible reaction is the court
always awarded the property right to the party that valued it most. But, in the study, the parties’
lawyers reported they did not believe there would have been any such bargaining had the court
awarded the other side the judgment.116 The lawyers identified two reasons for this lack of post-
judgment bargaining. First, acrimony towards the other party was an important reason for the
lack of such bargaining.117 Such acrimony can be the result of anger generated during the
adversarial litigation process. Second, the parties viewed the dispute to be about principle, not
about money and stated they would feel ashamed to receive or pay compensation for property
rights they felt were incommensurable with money.118

Farnsworth suggests that economists build more contextual models that capture such
phenomena. This paper demonstrates that including emotions in economic models does this. One
can see how emotions that are independent of strategic beliefs change the standard analysis in a
straightforward way. The usual story hypothesizes that if a court assigns a property right to a
party who values it less than another party, there is a range of monetary payments that will make
both parties better off if the property right is exchanged for an amount of money in that range.
Clearly, if the party the court awarded the property right suffers fixed amounts of negative utility
by receiving money from the other party due to anger and shame, then if those amounts are large
enough, the first party can be worse off than if it kept the property right. Similarly, if the party
paying money suffers fixed amounts of negative utility due to anger and shame from doing so,
then if those amounts are large enough, that party can be worse off than if that party did not
acquire the property right by post-judgment bargaining. In essence, the range of mutually
acceptable monetary payments disappears if there are large enough negative emotions from the

115 Ward Fransworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 
116 Id. at 384 (reporting this finding).
117 Id. at 395 (describing the rancorous nature of nuisance cases and property litigation between neighbors, 
where parties end up not on speaking terms).
118 Id. at 397-400 (describing how parties would feel shame from paying or receiving money in nuisance cases 
and property litigation between neighbors).
The litigation process itself. In addition, the idea that post-judgment bargaining is analogous to making and receiving “bribes” suggests a negative emotional frame of reference.

It is also possible to formally build models of bargaining in nuisance cases after judgment by applying psychological game theory. The anger and shame that one feels from paying or receiving money may very well increase the more that one believes the court should have decided differently than it did. People are less willing to pay for what they think they should have received in the first place. This explains anger that depends on beliefs. People may also be less willing to be paid for what a court has awarded them if they feel there is legitimacy to the court’s decision. This explains shame that depends on beliefs. There may thus be both high levels of anger and shame to the parties privately undoing a court’s judgment. Any non-psychological game tree for such post-judgment bargaining is convertible into a psychological reciprocity game utilizing a general transformation.\(^{119}\) In such a converted game, not only do judicial or post-judgment bargained outcomes, but also parties’ expectations or intentions affect parties’ feelings. Such expectations or intentions are related to process concerns.

This section concludes by discussing the role that emotions can play in two particular settings of bargaining over property rights: mergers or acquisitions and divorce. There are many accounts of the machinations and personalities involved with corporate mergers and acquisitions in the press and popular culture.\(^{120}\) In fact, both the processes of and outcomes to making deals command a lot of public attention.\(^{121}\) Clearly, belief-dependent anger can upset such bargaining. In addition, the psychological games in section 3 can be applied to mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures. In particular, in each of the psychological games discussed in section 3, suppose

\(^{119}\) Falk & Fischbacher, *supra* note 72, at 12 (providing this general transformation in equation (7)).

\(^{120}\) See, e.g. Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, *Barbarians at the Gate* (1990) and Bruce Wasserstein, *Big Deal* (describing the takeover of RJR-Nabisco).
that party A is a potential acquiring corporation and that party B is a target firm. Then, the proposed terms of a merger or acquisition might involve an even or equitable distribution of joint profits if there are such corporate norms. By their nature, mergers and acquisitions negotiations can be delicate and fragile. But, parties may create additional instability by provoking negative feelings that arise in response to violating corporate norms or accepted business practices.

The rhetoric of property can and has been applied to analyze marriages, divorce law, and children. Clearly, spouses bargain over many things, including the sexual division of labor. Rhona Mahony examines the sexual division of labor in the home by drawing on such diverse fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature, religion, movies, and insights about negotiation from economics and game theory. She stresses the role that beliefs regarding the sexual division of labor play in how women and men negotiate. The traditional stereotypical view of women being less confrontational than men can explain experimental evidence of sexual discrimination in new car sales. Mahoney also discusses how love affects marital bargaining. Feelings of love during marriage can reduce the sorts of anger discussed in sections 2 and 3. But, feelings of hate during a divorce might correspondingly exacerbate the sorts of anger discussed in sections 2 and 3. Indeed, the degree of love during a marriage could

122 Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi rents; or “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life”, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 287-303 (1987) (suggesting that marriage generates quasi rents and discussing alternative informal and legal means of protecting such quasi rents).
124 Margaret Jane Radin, What, if Anything, is Wrong with Baby Selling? 26 PAC. L.J. 135, 136 (1995) (arguing that how we morally evaluate a transaction depends partly on how we think of it).
126 Id. at 27-28.
be highly correlated with the degree of hate during a divorce, especially if love and hate themselves depend on strategic beliefs.

The analysis in this Article can be extended in several ways. First is the issue of how repeated play affects psychological games. Even though bargaining over property rights might be a unique occurrence, the negotiations leading up to it are sequential processes that occur in real time. This raises the possibility of reputation and linkage effects across negotiations if one player faces a series of potential other players. It would be interesting to examine the psychological emotional analogue of repeated game theory.

A related concern is whether such effects will be accentuated by relaxing the assumption of common knowledge of payoffs. After all, different individuals have different emotional responses that may depend on beliefs about strategic behavior. In light of the diversity of emotional responses as functions of about strategic beliefs, what happens if people without particular emotional responses that depend on strategic beliefs mimic those with such emotional responses? Is there an equilibrium proportion of people that possess emotional responses that depend on strategic beliefs under some type of evolutionary adjustment process?

Because individuals can have many different emotional responses that depend on strategic beliefs, the issue of which ones accurately describe a particular situation is clearly a crucial empirical question. The focus of the psychological game-theoretic models in this Article has been on how emotional responses that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior can, as opposed to must, occur in any bargaining over property rights. But, the question of whether they do is ultimately an empirical one.

Finally, the focus on psychological equilibria assumes that people will come to possess rational beliefs about strategic behavior. Such a condition of rational expectations could fail to

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128 Mahony, supra note 125, at 59-60.
describe real world people who have trouble learning and it excludes the possibility that people are optimizing in the presence of delusions, self-induced or otherwise. While incorrect beliefs about strategic behavior do not occur in a psychological game-theoretic equilibrium, they may occur in the real world. Fortunately, there are formal models of people without correct beliefs making decisions. In any formal representation of a game tree, players’ beliefs that are not determined in equilibrium can be represented by fixed beliefs. Emotions that depend on such exogenous beliefs are similar to emotions that do not depend on beliefs about strategic behavior in the sense that both types of emotions can be formally captured by altering utility payoffs by fixed numerical amounts.

5. Conclusions

This Article demonstrates how such emotions as anger and shame can influence the outcome and process of bargaining over property rights. In so doing, this paper envisions a more complicated and realistic vision of bargaining than found in standard law and economics. The fiction of parties rationally negotiating in a dispassionate and cool manner is ubiquitous in law and economics models. Even were such behavior to be desirable as a normative model, it certainly leaves much to be desired as a description of the world. The neoclassical model of economics is blind to the emotional realities of human interaction. None of us would deny that people feel emotions on a regular basis. One can, however, argue that although emotions have real effects,

\[129\] See generally George A. Akerlof, The Economics of Illusion, 1 Econ. & Pol. 1 (1989) (providing two interesting models of decision-making under illusion).
they have only "second-order" effects in motivating behavior. In other words, emotions can help break ties in choosing among otherwise indifferent alternatives.\(^{130}\)

This Article suggests in the alternative that emotions not only can break ties in preferences, but also they can play a primary role in the process of constructing preferences and making decisions. Emotions also provide a valuable source of information to decision-makers.\(^{131}\) Emotions that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior can also provide a theoretical explanation for well-known endowment and framing effects. The difference between a person’s willingness to pay and that same person’s willingness to accept for the same physical commodity that is the result of an endowment effect can be understood as an example of preferences being dependent on expectations of entitlements. The asymmetric perception between gains and losses can be due to associated positive and negative feelings. Such effects have important implications not only for the efficiency of property law,\(^{132}\) but also for contract law.\(^{133}\)

The models in this Article suggest a conception of bargaining that differs from the standard unemotional analysis by incorporating emotions that may or may not depend on beliefs about strategic behavior. The relationship between these alternative viewpoints is worth examining. It is worth noting that this Article does not contradict Coase's theorem, once emotional payoffs are factored into a party's subjective valuation or willingness to engage in bargaining over property rights. Thus, Coase's theorem predicts the actual outcome, but for a

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130 Elster, supra note 20, at 59-60 (discussing the view of emotions as tie-breakers).
131 M ARTHA  C. N USSBAUM  & A MARTYA  K. S EN, T HE  Q UALITY  OF  L IFE  AT 1-6 (1993) (arguing that such difficult issues as poverty, damages, privacy, or mitigation can not be adequately addressed without the information that emotions provide).
different reason than in his analysis. Putting aside the historical question of what Coase really meant or intended to say, the important point is that because real humans experience emotions, bargaining among humans is different from negotiations between automatons or "robots" programmed without any emotional responses. Ignoring the scope and power of emotions for motivating human behavior in our models is unnecessary, if not undesirable; while ignoring the scope and power of emotions for motivating human behavior in legal and policy analysis is misleading, if not dangerous.

Legal rules may shape emotions by selecting a set of self-fulfilling beliefs of what should occur. Legal intervention should occur if the people are better off in terms of their own utilities, taking into account emotional considerations. Officials who view efficiency as the sole objective of legal policy overlook the feelings that can arise over the inequity of some negotiations. Public officials often seem to be surprised by the outrage or anger that citizens express in reaction to events. To ignore such passions during negotiations over property rights can result in disastrous, unintended and perilous outcomes. Taking into account such passions avoids bad feelings, at the very least, and might even prevent disharmony and unrest.

The above discussion provides a possible justification for legal intervention into private bargaining because the sensitivity of people to (perceived) inequality or inequity may block voluntary exchanges that are otherwise mutually beneficial, in the absence of considerations of fairness and other emotions. But, unanswered are the questions of whether and how such intervention can be best accomplished. If the sensitivity to inequity or inequality occurs in the form of emotions that depend on beliefs about strategic decisions, then psychological game theory provides answers to both of these questions. Intervention is effective when it changes individual
preferences by changing expectations or beliefs about strategic behavior. \footnote{This is related to, but distinct from, asymmetric information or myopia based justifications for social policies designed to change private preferences. See Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Legal Interference with Private Preferences}, 53 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1129, 1158-66 (1986) (providing those arguments); Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{Preferences and Politics}, 20 Phil. \\& Pub. Aff. 3, 24-27 (1992) (same).}

The initial assignment of property rights or entitlements can select a set of self-fulfilling beliefs. Intervention should occur if after such intervention people are better off in terms of their own utilities, taking into account considerations of fairness and other emotions. Viewing allocational efficiency as the sole objective of legal policy overlooks the fact most people have strong feelings over the fairness of negotiations.

Of course, negotiations over property rights are quite diverse in their legal and non-legal history, their physical and human dimensions, financial and tax details, and other motivations. This means that specific legal rules may require detailed case by case analysis. The realization of potential gains from bargaining over property rights, however, is not automatic. The approach of this Article applies to not just preliminary negotiations over property rights, but also the inevitable renegotiations that must occur in response to unforeseen contingencies. Emotional responses that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior are even more important in repeated games than in one-shot games because of the longer horizon of perceived inequality, inequity, or injustice.

The central insight of this Article is not just simply that emotions matter, but also that expectations and emotions can interact in ways that matter. It should be obvious that although this Article focused on bargaining over property rights, the insights of this Article apply to all types of negotiations. \footnote{See Max H. Bazerman, \textit{Smart Money Decisions: Why You Do What You Do With Your Money (And How to Change It for the Better)} 105-18 (1999) (discussing the role that fairness considerations and emotions based on them affect bargaining).} All of us continually negotiate. Bargaining can be over a divorce settlement, peace treaty, or international environmental accord. Negotiations might arbitrate...
conflicts between agents, principals or between parties in a labor dispute. People haggle over finalizing the terms in a contract agreement or the price of a car or house. In all of these myriad situations, the importance of emotions and related concerns for adhering to various norms of fairness are omnipresent. Negotiators, whether they are political or organizational leaders, diplomats, lawyers, or arbitrators can only improve their bargaining performance by understanding and being aware of the stuff of life, namely, emotions in general and in particular, emotions that depend on beliefs about strategic behavior.
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