1. You advance two main arguments against Raz’s service conception of authority: The first argument aims to show that the NJT may be a good answer to the subjection problem, and is probably a necessary condition for an authority's legitimacy, but it is not sufficient because it cannot justify the moral duty to comply with a legitimate authoritative directive. (p. 21) The second argument aims to show that political authority cannot be justified in an aggregative manner, as Raz/Simmons assume, because the value of common goods is not reducible to background reasons for action that an authority’s subjects have as individuals.

Our question is whether these two conclusions are entirely compatible: it seems that your second argument – about the non-aggregative nature of legitimacy -- shows that the NJT is not even a necessary condition for the legitimacy of authorities; and if so, what is left of the answer to the subjection problem?

2. Your main argument against the NJT is that it actually proves too much, because it equally applies to expert advice and recommendations, cases in which there is no moral obligation to comply. The conclusion you draw is that the NJT is simply not apt to the task of justifying a moral duty to comply, and therefore fails the challenge of justifying legitimate authority. But another conclusion might be that there is no such moral duty, even in the case of legitimate authorities. In other words, could it not be a possible, alternative, conclusion that people may have good reasons to follow an authoritative directive, but that such reasons do not necessarily amount to a moral obligation (that is, even when the authority is legitimate)?

3. With respect to your argument about the non-aggregative nature of legitimacy, we were not sure what exactly the argument for your position is. Your point seems to be that the common good cannot be reduced to reasons that apply to the subjects individually. This point you exemplify with the conscription lottery example. First, we were not quite sure what is the difference that the lottery element makes in the argument? Individuals may have a reason to have a lottery decision procedure and participate in it, which means that they would also have a reason to comply with the lottery’s results, whatever they turn out to be. Second, and more generally, how exactly would we explain the value of a common good (or a solution to a collective action problem for that matter) without reasons that apply to individuals in having the common good and contribute to its production?
4. By way of clarification, can you explain what is the importance of emphasizing in your argument, as you do, that authorities exercise power; your argument against the NJT does not seem to depend on explaining how authorities come to have the power they claim; it seems to depend on the idea that the NJT cannot explain how an authority’s directive, if legitimate, is morally obligatory. (The point comes up again in your discussion of Green’s argument, but we were not quite sure that we understood this debate about the priority of power/liability issue; to have the power to impose an obligation entails that the person who is liable to the power is under an obligation, does it not?)