

REFLECTING UPON THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES' 2016 ELECTION AND TRAVEL BAN: WHY MIGHT FEWER FOREIGN BUSINESSPEOPLE, TOURISTS, STUDENTS, AND RELATIVES BE VISITING THE UNITED STATES?

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ABSTRACT

In this article, I summarize my findings from an original demographic research paper on how the number of arrivals by different foreign nationals to the United States has changed through the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the government's executive order to ban all travelers from seven countries and drastically cut refugee admissions, and the Supreme Court's first decision to uphold a partial version of that ban—all widely unexpected events. I found by applying Poisson regression to government data on over 200 million I-94s collected from air-borne passengers of all in-bound flights between November 2015 and August 2017 that these three events were significantly associated with a later decrease in voluntary entries of most foreign nationals not targeted by the government's travel ban. How might these shifts in the number of foreigners visiting the U.S. reflect a decreased interest in visiting the U.S. among foreign citizens? How might that vary depending on whether their original purpose of travel was business, tourism, study, or a family visit? Nationalities not directly affected by these events may nonetheless had a sense of "linked fate" with those nationalities that were and therefore felt vulnerable with visiting the U.S.; targeted nationalities may have taken a "now or never" approach to coming to the U.S. while they still could; finally, some might stipulate that many foreign citizens found the political and policy changes in the U.S. made it less culturally appealing and a visit ethically fraught. in 2016–2017. This article by providing data on what has happened asks if these or other hypotheses may explain decrease in visitors to the U.S. and more importantly solicit additional ideas, evidence, and sources of data from readers to better explain how sudden political events and changes in policy impact travelers' interest in visiting the U.S. and on more general level other countries. Information is valuable. A fall in visitors consequential due to the unintended consequences and chilling effects such events have had the mobility of groups not targeted by the events as well as U.S. citizens that benefit from cultural and economic exchanges with them. Assessing and accounting for these cultural and economic harms on U.S. citizens—rather than only refugees and foreign nationals from the targeted countries—may be a more comprehensive and

politically efficacious way for Congress members in all political parties to objectively assess the long-run benefits and costs of xenophobic immigration politics and policies on their constituents and the country as a whole.

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, I wish to summarize results from a demographic research paper of mine which found that fewer foreigners entered the United States after the 2016 election, the travel ban proposal and the court upholding the travel ban. Second, this paper is also a special request for information and ideas from lawyers and legal scholars about why they think—based on their experiences with acquaintances and legal clients affected by the ban—why fewer foreigners with different purposes of travel and citizenship have been coming to the U.S. This input can help enrich my results with qualitative data on traveler motivations that can help explain why foreigners with certain nationalities and purposes of travel have been coming to the United States less.

Specifically, this article describes how the number of foreign nationals arriving in the U.S. has changed through the 2016 presidential election, the executive order¹ that banned all travelers from seven countries² and drastically cut refugee entry (“the travel ban”), and the Supreme Court’s first decision to uphold a partial version of that ban³—all widely unexpected events. These events were consequential as they had practical implications not only for foreigners and many Americans who make a living from tourism, education, and international business but also but also extending to all Americans who interact culturally and socially with non-Americans. But while the consequential changes in the volume of visitors from each country are clear enough, one must ask why they have occurred, and what sources of data and evidence might bolster different interpretations. By considering and developing arguments for how these events may have changed traveler motives and therefore differently for citizens of various foreign countries and visa types, we can develop a better understanding of how the travel ban may have impacted the motivations of heterogeneous travelers and therefore the number of visitors to the U.S.

Part II provides some historical background on the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the travel ban proposal, and the Court’s first of the upholding the travel ban. In Part III, I explain the data source and my methods for this study. Part IV summarizes my results on how the average levels of entries by various nationalities before and after each of these three events differ from each other, as well as how percentage change in the

¹ Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), *superseded by executive order*, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).

² Tom Kertscher, *Were the 7 Nations Identified in Donald Trump’s Travel Ban Named by Barack Obama as Terror Hotbeds?*, POLITIFACT (Feb. 7, 2017), <https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2017/feb/07/reince-priebus/were-7-nations-identified-donald-trumps-travel-ban/> (President Trump’s executive order prohibited “nearly all citizens from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen from entering the United States for 90 days”).

³ Michael D. Shear & Adam Liptak, *Supreme Court Takes Up Travel Ban Case, and Allows Parts to Go Ahead*, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban-case.html>.

number of visitors from various countries in the current year compared to the previous year. Part V discusses the consequences of the three events and suggests possible theories on how we might explain the observed changes in the flows of foreigners to the U.S. from specific countries and motivations such as study, business, tourism, and visiting relatives. Finally, in Part VI I request from readers what further data or evidence might be available or that they may have to more persuasively test and prove or disprove hypotheses about why fewer foreign citizens of different countries and with differing motivations may have wanted to visit the U.S.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In recent years, the press has documented a sequence of widely unexpected events that commentators suggest has led to a legislatively-induced decrease in the number of foreigners entering the U.S. First, Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election, defying predictions from most polling organizations.⁴ For seventeen months, his presidential campaign frequently took on a tone which most foreigners and prospective immigrants perceived as hostile towards them. Then on January 27, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order—commonly referred to as the travel ban or Muslim travel ban—that banned foreigners from seven countries from entering U.S. territory for ninety days, and for 120 days if they were a refugee fleeing persecution.⁵ This executive order revoked up to sixty thousand previously issued visas to nationals from these seven countries.⁶ This surprised many Americans and political analysts. For about four months, many state and federal district courts struck down versions of this executive order⁷ until June 6, 2017, when the Supreme Court upheld a limited version of the travel ban.⁸ This also came as a shock to many. The ban, however, never took effect right after the executive branch immediately issued it because courts in New York and Massachusetts immediately blocked it on January 28–29; its legislative impact only extended to barring travelers for a couple days.⁹ The immediate impact of the travel ban therefore was mostly symbolic in that it may have signaled to foreigners that they were not

⁴ See, e.g., Mona Chalabi, *Yes, the Election Polls Were Wrong. Here's Why*, *Guardian* (Nov. 9, 2016), <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/09/polls-wrong-donald-trump-election> (noting that Donald Trump won the presidential election despite having a “15% chance of winning based on polling predictions”).

⁵ Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,978–79.

⁶ Rebecca Hersher, *Federal Judge Stays Trump Travel Order, But Many Visas Already Revoked*, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Feb. 3, 2017, 4:42 PM), <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/03/513306413/state-department-says-fewer-than-60-000-visas-revoked-under-travel-order> (“The State Department said . . . ‘roughly 60,000 individuals’ visas were provisionally revoked’ as a result of Trump’s Jan. 27 executive order barring refugees from seven countries.”).

⁷ See, e.g., *Washington v. Trump*, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that Washington state and Minnesota state had standing to challenge the executive order).

⁸ Robert Barnes & Matt Zapotosky, *Supreme Court Allows Limited Version of Trump’s Travel Ban to Take Effect and Will Consider Case in Fall*, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-limited-version-of-trumps-travel-ban-to-take-effect-will-consider-case-in-fall/2017/06/26/97afa314-573e-11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html.

⁹ Steve Almasy & Darran Simon, *Timeline of President Trump’s Travel Bans*, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), <https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/10/us/trump-travel-ban-timeline/index.html>.

welcome. By December 2017, the Supreme Court fully upheld a limited version of the travel ban, paving the way for it to eventually become a law.¹⁰

Yet, to what extent were the motivations of travelers in general affected by signals to specific foreigners not directly affected by the policy change? Three factors may have signaled to foreigners that they were not welcome in the U.S. based respectively on (1) the voting preferences of nearly half of the 58 percent of U.S. citizens that cared to vote in the 2016 election; (2) the preferences of the new President of the U.S. government; and (3) the court system—the branch of government then most capable and willing to check the President’s power. I propose three possible arguments as to why fewer travelers from countries not barred from entry might come to the U.S. and ask if there are any more theories that may explain the observed patterns. My prior research finds that these events reduced entries of foreigners not targeted by the U.S. government—Africans, Europeans, and Latin American visitors—far more than Middle Easterners, who were the primary targets of the ban. I suggest the following various formal academic theories as to why this might be case. One might claim that although the travel ban did not specifically target Latin American visitors, the ban alongside the President’s xenophobic rhetoric made Latin Americans feel vulnerable, since they identified with those targeted by the ban. This resonates with the “linked fate” theory developed by political scientists Michael Dawson¹¹ and Chris Zepeda-Millán¹² who respectively argued that the mid-twentieth century African-American civil rights movement and the 2006 “day without an immigrant” protests politically mobilized many white Americans and Latino citizens who did not feel directly politically threatened but felt that their future fate was respectively connected with that of politically threatened black Americans and unauthorized Latino immigrants. In a similar way, foreigners who may have identified with the targeted nationalities might have perceived generally xenophobic policies as hostile and possibly a sign that the government might exclude them next, and correspondingly reduced the number of discretionary legal visits by Latin Americans. In contrast, Middle-Easterners—whose liberties to legally enter the U.S. were more directly threatened by the ban—might actually have been driven to enter the U.S. in larger numbers while they still could, similarly to the way many Chinese residents of Wuhan left that city or China in January 2020 for Chinese New Year, knowing that Beijing might soon put the whole city under lockdown and they therefore would be unable to leave. On a global level, migration scholars Czaika and de Haas for example found that between 1973 and 2012 visa policies from a sample of all countries that migration policies tend to reduce outflow of migrants even more than they reduced inflows.¹³ When a government was about to implement more restrictive visa policies, Czaika and de Haas suggested that migrants would enter while they still

¹⁰ Adam Liptak, *Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html>. At the time, the most recent version of the travel ban had been issued by President Trump in September 2017. *Id.*

¹¹ MICHAEL C. DAWSON, *BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS*, 82-89 (Princeton University Press 1995).

¹² CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, *LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION: IMMIGRATION, RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM* 15–18 (Cambridge University Press 2017).

¹³ See generally Mathias Czaika & Hein de Haas, *The Effect of Visas on Migration Processes*, 51 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 893 (2017).

could and thereafter be even less willing to leave and engage in circular migration. This phenomenon variably goes by the name of “now-or-never,” “anticipation effects,” or “inter-temporal substitution.” Czaika and Haas (2017) ultimately find no such significant effect and suggest this is because visa policy changes are unexpected and not announced beforehand. However, other researchers have also suggested policies like the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that bolster border security disrupt historically circular flows of migrants and inadvertently increase the number of permanent immigrants by those who fear being unable to return if they leave.¹⁴ Therefore, potential migrants might enter the U.S. while they still could and thereafter be even less willing to leave and engage in circular migration. Finally, some foreigners, like Europeans most inclined to visit the U.S., may dislike the xenophobic and “America-first” values that the country began manifesting throughout 2016 and 2017. Therefore, for those that have a choice of whether to visit for the US or not, they may have found the US to be a less attractive country to visit for taste-based discriminatory reasons of maintaining cultural distinction or even ethical reasons rather than the political shocks.¹⁵ These arguments, however, are neither exhaustive nor exclusive, and additional information or ideas from readers as to why foreigners with various purposes of travel and nationality may have decided not to come to the U.S. would contribute greatly to explaining my quantitative results.

Global media widely reported upon each event so most foreigners likely heard about them, and I did not find in supplementary analysis any differences in news coverage between major news sources with distinctive audiences in terms of language like *Le Monde*, *El Diario* or *Al-Jazeera*.¹⁶ One could think of multiple reasons why foreigners may have found the U.S. more or less attractive after the election. Trump argued that the ban was necessary because it would bar entry of foreigners most likely to carry out attacks against Americans.¹⁷ This is a national security argument that some foreigners—particularly those that are highly xenophobic and have also suffered terrorist attacks—might find legitimate. Yet other foreigners may have developed a more negative view of the U.S. Surveys suggest that amongst many foreign nationals, Trump is one of the most disliked presidents in recent history because of his record of anti-immigrant rhetoric, foreign policies perceived by other countries as hostile to their national interests, and poor diplomatic rapport with leaders of other countries.¹⁸

¹⁴ See generally Douglas S. Massey, Karen A. Pren & Jorge Durand, *Why Border Enforcement Backfired*, 121 AM. J. SOC. 1557 (2016).

¹⁵ PIERRE BOURDIEU, *DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE*, 81-82 (Harvard University Press 1984).

¹⁶ Jacob Thomas, *Do Anti-Mobility Policies Make A Country Less Unattractive? The Heterogeneous Impact of Targeted Xenophobic Signals on Entries of Non-Targeted Nationalities into the United States 12* (2020) (working paper) (available at https://github.com/thomas12679/travel_shocks/blob/master/Do%20Anti-Mobility%20Policies%20Make%20Us%20Less%20Attractive%3F%20International%20Migration%20Review%20no%20figures_tables%206.5.2020.pdf).

¹⁷ Tyler Lloyd, *Closing the Golden Door: The Potential Legality of Donald Trump's Ban on Muslim Immigration*, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399, 402 (2019).

¹⁸ Richard Wike et al., *Trump's International Ratings Remain Low Especially Among Key Allies*, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2018), <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/>.

Although the Trump administration was later careful to avoid using language that could indicate that the travel ban targeted Muslim populations after many liberal groups began critically referring to the travel ban as a “Muslim ban,” various civil rights groups and attorneys argued that the travel ban clearly discriminated against Muslims.¹⁹ Therefore, citizens of predominately Muslim nation-states may have been less inclined to enter the U.S. due to fears of being the victims of hate crimes. By adopting the travel ban, the U.S. may have signaled to foreigners that it had little respect for international law and the rights and protections its Constitution provides to foreigners.²⁰ This may have made them feel less safe and welcomed in the U.S. or caused those coming from democratic or more liberal regimes governed by the rule of law and freedom of religion to perceive the U.S. as a less desirable destination... In sum, the following three events likely had distinct effects on traveler inflows in that: (1) the election sent a general symbolic signal that foreigners were less welcome than during the pre-Trump era; (2) the executive branch’s first failed attempt to ban foreigners sent a specific symbolic signal to Muslim foreigners that they were especially not welcome; and (3) the judicial branch’s upholding of the ban sent a message that all branches of government did not welcome certain foreigners based upon their citizenship. But if the hostile tone of Trump’s presidential campaign toward Muslims and immigrants, the suspected motives behind the ban, and the Court ruling discouraged more people from visiting the U.S. than the actual ban, what data is available about traveler motives that might allow us to demonstrate that this is the case?

III. DATA

In my demographic research, I have drawn upon data collected by the U.S. National Travel and Tourism Office on the country of citizenship for all authorized foreigners arriving to the U.S. from six geographic regions (N=193,320,827) and twenty countries (N=220,148,307)²¹ to construct twenty-six different panel datasets across thirty-five months (November 2014 to September 2017).²² Due to the small difference between the two

¹⁹ Eleanor Acer & Robyn Barnard, *Civil Rights: The “Muslim Ban” Violates U.S. Law and Treaty Commitments*, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation_journal/2016-17/summer/civil_rights_muslim_ban_violates_us_law_and_treaty_commitments/.

²⁰ Specifically, some legal scholars argue that barring the entry of lawful permanent residents from Muslim-majority countries violates Fifth Amendment of U.S. Constitution and the U.S.’s treaty obligations, including the nondiscrimination provisions of the Refugee Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. *Id.*

²¹ The countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, India, Russia, Australia, Taiwan, China, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Colombia, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Italy. The regions are Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Oceania.

²² *Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States: International, Overseas, Canada, Mexico, World Regions, and Top 50 Overseas Countries: Arrivals Data-Country of Residence (COR)*, NAT’L TRAVEL & TOURISM OFF., <https://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2017-I-001/index.asp> (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter *Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States*]. When I checked the website again later in September, the data was gone, replaced by longitudinally incomplete dataset under construction. The data manager told me by email would be finished and replaced in June 2019. Although this dataset contained information on the top 50 nationalities, this listed visitors by country of residence (rather than citizenship), enabling me to examine more nationalities. The last time the data was for visitors by country of citizenship was incomplete, I cross-checked this data with what I found a year before, and I found differences in the

sample sizes (26,827,480 observations), the data for the countries should cover around 90 percent of foreign visitors to the U.S. with data from only twenty countries.²³ The nationals of these twenty countries contribute the most tourist revenue to the U.S.²⁴ I excluded Venezuela because its economic crisis has worsened and therefore it would be difficult to distinguish between the preference for travel to the U.S. and a desire to seek asylum.

This data is based upon the number of I-94 forms passengers turned into U.S. Custom and Borders Protection officers at all U.S. airports from November 2014 to September 2017. Those forms provide census data, rather than statistics, of all foreigners legally entering the country. I recognize that the U.S. government may admit some arrivals who do not turn in an I-94 form because they come as asylum seekers; however these arrivals are a low percentage of total travelers arriving by air.

Furthermore, many foreigners may not immediately change their travel plans and are not traveling for leisure or due to any specific preference to visit the U.S.²⁵ Many people make their travel decisions anywhere from several months to a few days before leaving. Flight tickets are cheapest twenty-one to 121 days before the departure day.²⁶ Many people may not even desire to come to the U.S. but are doing it out of obligations to others. They also may have pre-planned visits to the U.S. scheduled before these events occurred and would have come regardless of whether they felt welcome or not. For example, travelers might wish to continue an educational program or finish a training, conduct business meetings required by their company, or visit family members. Therefore, one may observe a lag in the impact of a travel ban.²⁷ Unfortunately, the recent data provided by the government about visitors' purposes for travel is only available at the annual level,²⁸ and, as noted above, its reliability is doubtful.

I examined the association between the number of travelers of a given nationality and the respective three events—the election, the travel ban, and the Court's upholding of the travel ban—by comparing the number of visitors that enter the country before and after the event. I examine this association while taking into account other phenomena that change over time and that may have affected the election including the tendency of people to travel more during certain months than others, income, oil prices, exchange rates, mass shootings, and intensity of media coverage about the events. I control for all these factors in my models and find little significant associations between them for specific nationalities across time except for

new data set and the data set I previously obtained. However, in any case, since I am more interested in changes in visitors based on their citizenship—not residence—and the last time I checked the website data by citizenship was unavailable (and the manager said it would only be available later), I chose to settle for using only the more longitudinally complete data that was available in 2018.

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ See, e.g., Hristina Byrnes, *These 25 Countries Make Up Almost All of U.S. Tourism*, 24/7 WALL ST. (Jan. 15, 2020, 9:03 AM), <https://247wallst.com/special-report/2019/07/24/countries-that-love-to-visit-america/> (“92% [of visitors to the U.S.] . . . came from . . . 25 countries”).

²⁵ Catey Hill, *This is Exactly How Many Days in Advance You Should Buy a Plane Ticket*, MARKETWATCH: MONEYISH (Mar. 21, 2018, 4:23 PM), <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-exactly-how-many-days-in-advance-you-should-buy-a-plane-ticket-2018-03-21-16882347>.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ This lag assumes people are not cancelling pre-arranged flights in light of the travel ban.

²⁸ *Non-Resident Arrivals to the United States*, *supra* note 22.

seasonality. I discuss my original method, data, and graphs in greater detail in the demographic research paper from which I derive the results I summarize below and which is available online at the link provided in the footnote.²⁹

IV. SUMMARY OF DEMOGRAPHIC FINDINGS

a. THE IMPACT OF THE 2016 ELECTION ON TRAVELER INFLOWS TO THE U.S.

Due to the sample size, I found all my results statistically significant at a 0.05 alpha level, and nearly all are also significant at a 0.0005 alpha level. The impact of seasonality is somewhere from two to five times larger than treatment. This suggests that accounting for these seasonality is important, especially with more people traveling internationally during some months (July and August) more than others (January and February),³⁰ and that the declines in visitors resulting from the election and ban are not as great as believed by journalists and commentators in mass and social media.³¹ I found in my prior research that African arrivals decreased more than any others during the period of the election compared to the period before, with Latin American travelers declining by roughly half that amount. Asian travelers overall had a tiny increase during the period after the election compared to the period before. Visitors from most other regions and overall had a small decline.³²

In analyzing the raw numbers of visitors, each of the three events resulted in fifteen thousand fewer visitors each month compared to the previous year.³³ This is greater than the roughly one thousand fewer people legally prohibited from entering the U.S. as a result of the ban during the brief period in 2017 when it was in effect.³⁴ Therefore, the greatest impact of these political events was not due to the ban but rather the signal the events sent to foreigners.

These findings about visitors from other regions conceal the fact that within different regions, visits from foreigners from specific countries may have changed at different rates. A country-level analysis seemed worthwhile. Although generally many foreigners reacted to the 2016 election with surprise, the intensity of disapproval of President-Elect Trump varied across nationalities. For example, some polls suggested that a majority of Chinese (54.4%) and Russians (82.6%) held positive views of President-Elect Trump

²⁹ See generally Thomas, *supra* note 16.

³⁰ Anna Serena Vergori, *Patterns of Seasonality and Tourism Demand Forecasting*, 23 *TOURISM ECON.* 1011, 1011 (2016).

³¹ E.g., Shivani Vora, *After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines*, *N.Y. TIMES* (Feb. 20, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html>.

³² Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 13–15.

³³ *Id.* at 13–16.

³⁴ Yeganeh Torbati, *U.S. Denied Tens of Thousands More Visas in 2018 Due to Travel Ban: Data*, *REUTERS: POL.* (Feb. 26, 2019, 12:00 PM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ban/us-denied-tens-of-thousands-more-visas-in-2018-due-to-travel-ban-data-idUSKCN1QF2KF>.

and hoped that he would defeat Hillary Clinton.³⁵ Despite this, I observe in my working paper that the number of travelers from Russia and Brazil declined the most, followed by Switzerland. The remaining countries all saw moderate to small declines except for increases in visitors from (in descending order) South Korea, Spain, Ireland, Taiwan, China, and Italy.³⁶

b. THE IMPACT OF THE JANUARY 2017 TRAVEL BAN ON TRAVELER INFLOWS TO THE U.S.

Fewer visitors from every region came to the U.S. in the period after the government passed the first travel ban than in the period before, in January 2017. African travelers again declined the most, followed by travelers from Latin America. Though the initial travel ban did not bar entry of Latin Americans, Latin Americans from many countries—particularly Mexico—were explicit targets of Trump's xenophobic rhetoric.³⁷ They may have believed that they would eventually confront the same fate as those Africans and Middle Easterners banned from entering. The decrease in Middle Eastern travelers after the ban, however, was about equal to the decline in travelers from Europe and Oceania.³⁸ Yet the travel ban only targeted those from five countries in the Middle East, raising questions about why visitors from Europe and Oceania may have declined. One could argue that Middle Easterners entered en masse because they worried that they might be unable to re-enter from abroad later on, though this raises the question of how one can know their true motivations.

On the country level, Russians had the largest decline in visitors in the period after the ban compared to the period before the ban, followed by Brazilians, Argentines, and Swiss.³⁹ Why might Russians be so unmotivated to come after the ban compared to the period before, especially after their preferred presidential candidate became the head of state? Most other nationalities declined modestly except for South Koreans, who came in far greater numbers after the ban, and more moderate increases of visitors from Ireland, Spain, and Taiwan. My findings also raised the question as to why South Koreans might be more motivated to come to the U.S. after the travel ban proposal.

c. THE SUPREME COURT'S UPHOLDING OF THE TRAVEL BAN (JUNE 2017)

After the Supreme Court partially upheld the ban in the case *Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project*,⁴⁰ the ban presumably would have

³⁵ Devon Haynie, *Why Do Russians and Chinese Support Trump?*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May. 5, 2017, 10:33 AM), <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-05-05/why-russians-chinese-backed-trumped-in-the-us-presidential-election>.

³⁶ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 15.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ See *Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project*, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017) (granting certiorari in part).

had a legislative impact, meaning its implementation would produce legislative and practical effects. Following this court ruling, the U.S. saw the largest decline in African and Latin American arrivals (excluding Mexico), with other regions showing the same moderate declines as after the ban. Within Latin America, my model estimates that the largest declines in arrivals were from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil.⁴¹ The declines from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil suggest that these Latin Americans may have been concerned that the U.S. would eventually treat them like people from the banned countries and Mexicans, even though Argentines and Brazilians may identify the least with the Mexicans, Central Americans, and Muslims primary targeted by the ban. The large declines in Russian arrivals may seem puzzling at first; but despite Trump's warm attitude toward the Russian government, under pressure by Congress he later placed sanctions on the country.⁴² Perhaps this decreased Russians' desire to visit the U.S. Arrivals from India—a country with a large Muslim minority—declined a bit as well.⁴³ They may have felt less welcome to the U.S. Notably, the only countries from which arrivals increased were South Korea, Canada, and Ireland.⁴⁴ What motivations might these nationals have to visit the U.S. in larger numbers than before the court ruling?

d. ACCOUNTING FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN CHANGES OVER TIME AND EVENTS

A model that accounts for how seasonality may have affected the impact of the events on the number of foreign arrivals reveals fewer stark differences in declines of visitors following the election. Arrivals from Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East had the greatest drops after the election. Total arrivals were actually greater in the period after the election compared to before because of an even higher number of arrivals from Asia in the period after compared to the period before. Among countries, the largest declines were among (in descending order) Brazilians, Russians, and Swiss visitors. In the period after the election (compared to the period of before) the U.S. received a far greater number of visitors from (in descending order) China, Taiwan, Spain, South Korea, and Argentina. The election seemed to only result in a smaller but still significant decrease in travelers.⁴⁵

After the ban, we observe a large drop in the number of arrivals from Africa and Latin America. One might argue that Africans and Latin Americans felt that they would eventually be banned as well since the ban only targeted two African nationalities and no Latin American nationalities. The decline among visitors from Middle Eastern countries was roughly equal to that of Asians and not as great as the decline in European arrivals or the world average. This may have been because the ban mostly targeted Middle

⁴¹ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 15.

⁴² See generally Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 (2017); *Trump Signs Russia Sanctions Bill, Moscow Calls It 'Trade War'*, CNBC: POL. (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:10 AM), <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/03/trump-signs-russia-sanctions-bill-moscow-calls-it-trade-war.html>.

⁴³ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 15.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 16–17.

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Eastern nationalities who feared the ban might apply to them and entered the U.S. while they still could whereas Europeans did not feel an urgency to enter because they did not expect to be banned.⁴⁶

e. CHANGE IN TRAVELERS FROM SAME MONTH IN PREVIOUS YEAR

Some of these events, like the ban, were followed by political contestations like protests⁴⁷ and legal challenges in court, such as the blocking of the ban.⁴⁸ These responses may have affected travel inflows. In my working paper, I found that between November 2015 and November 2016 a lower number of total foreigners came to the U.S. as compared to the previous year.⁴⁹ I look at the percentage change in travelers in the months following the events compared to the same month in the previous year, to control for seasonality. Although this annual percentage change had been plummeting in the month before and after the travel ban, it immediately spiked in the month following district courts blocking the ban in February.⁵⁰ Perhaps the reason for this sudden increase is that, overall, travelers entered the country while they still could—or could there be other reasons that people were suddenly motivated to come to the U.S.?

Two regions of interest are Africa and the Middle East, since the original ban included two African countries and five Middle Eastern countries.⁵¹ Many nationals from Africa and the Middle East may have feared that the U.S. government might later expand the ban to include their countries given that they were geographically clustered and share common traits to the countries affected by the ban. For example, most of their population is Muslim and people of color, and their citizens generally have a low per capita income and a relatively low level of political freedom.⁵² My working paper, however, found fewer Middle Eastern visitors during the twelve months before the 2016 election than during the same months after.⁵³ The number of visitors from the Middle East became negative shortly after December 2015 when then-candidate Trump promised that, if elected, he would stop all Muslims from entering the U.S. The number of Middle Eastern visitors then increased right after the travel ban compared the same months in 2016.⁵⁴ After the Supreme Court partially approved the ban, the percentage change in visitors in 2017 compared to the same months in 2016 goes from negative to positive. A large number of people in the Middle East—both those affected

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ Laura Gambino, Sabrina Siddiqui, Paul Owen & Edward Helmore, *Thousands Protest Against Trump Travel Ban in Cities and Airports Nationwide*, *GUARDIAN* (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:01 PM), <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/29/protest-trump-travel-ban-muslims-airports>.

⁴⁸ See *supra* note 7 and accompanying text.

⁴⁹ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 17.

⁵⁰ See *Timeline of the Muslim Ban*, ACLU WASH., <https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban> (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (“A federal judge in New York granted the American Civil Liberties Union’s request for a nationwide temporary injunction blocking the deportation of all people stranded in U.S. airports under President Trump’s new Muslim ban. Four other courts also weighed in, each one a defeat for President Trump.”).

⁵¹ Kertscher, *supra* note 2.

⁵² Jacob Thomas, *When Political Freedom Does Not Offer Travel Freedom: The Varying Determinants of Visa-Free Travel Opportunities*, 58 *INT’L MIGRATION* 80, 80–97 (2020).

⁵³ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 18–19.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

by the ban and those unaffected—may have been eager to enter the U.S. before the ban went into effect.⁵⁵

In addition, the annual percentage change in African arrivals was positive during the months before the election. But this quickly became negative in the period after Trump won the election. The ban targeted Somalia and Sudan, but the Supreme Court’s upholding the ban—rather than the travel ban itself—seemed to result in a slight increase in the number of visitors.⁵⁶ This begs the question: why might Africans be more motivated to enter the U.S. after the Court upheld the ban?

The U.S. had fewer European arrivals during the election year compared to the prior year. Europeans only began to visit more than the previous year after the courts blocked the travel ban.⁵⁷ Why might Europeans be less motivated to visit the U.S. after the courts blocked the travel ban, and what evidence is available to prove this shift in motivation? More Latin American visitors (excluding Mexicans) entered the U.S. compared to the previous year, yet fewer entered right after the election. This continued to drop even more rapidly, suggesting further needed research about why Latin Americans became less interested in visiting the U.S.⁵⁸ Much of Trump’s discourse targeted Mexicans,⁵⁹ but his most restrictive policies targeted Muslims and Africans, rather than Latinos.⁶⁰ Yet during the beginning of the term, deportations were surprisingly fewer than under Obama,⁶¹ so it is unclear why Latin Americans would be less inclined to come, especially since the travel ban targeted Muslims. Furthermore, the annual percentage change of Latin Americans began to increase right after the Court upheld the ban.⁶² In light of the above, the questions must be asked: why might foreign nationals from the Middle East be more motivated to come to the U.S. after the Court upheld the ban, and what data is available to demonstrate any change in motivation?

Among specific countries, five patterns are detected in the percentage change of visitors: (1) nationalities coming in more before the election (e.g., Russia) or in roughly equal numbers (e.g., India) dropped drastically after the election;⁶³ (2) nationalities increasing before the election and decreased after the election (e.g., Mexicans and Argentines);⁶⁴ (3) nationalities coming in either at higher or lower rates both before and after the shocks do not

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 19–20.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ Eugene Scott, *Trump’s Most Insulting—and Violent—Language is Often Reserved for Immigrants*, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:21 PM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/02/trumps-most-insulting-violent-language-is-often-reserved-immigrants/> (giving examples of Trump’s anti-Mexican rhetoric).

⁶⁰ See Kertscher, *supra* note 2 (neither Mexico nor any other predominantly-Latino country was the target of the 2017 travel ban).

⁶¹ Zack Budryk, *Deportations Lower Under Trump Administration than Obama: Report*, HILL (Nov. 18, 2019, 11:25 AM), <https://thehill.com/latino/470900-deportations-lower-under-trump-than-obama-report> (“The Trump administration has deported fewer overall people than were deported under former President Obama despite the ongoing crackdown on immigrants without legal status”).

⁶² Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 19–20.

⁶³ Chinese and Colombian visitors also follow these patterns.

⁶⁴ Mexican visitors decreased greatly after both after the election and the travel ban. Argentines also decreased, although more gradually. Colombian and Haitian visitors also follow these patterns.

change much through the election (e.g., Brazil and South Korea);⁶⁵ (4) nationalities having a percentage change that fluctuated greatly before and after the three events, so on net there was not a great change (e.g., Japan and Spain);⁶⁶ and (5) nationalities having a negative percentage change in visitors before the election then became positive after the Court blocked the ban (e.g., France, Canada, and Australia).⁶⁷

Together, these five general patterns offer a more nuanced and heterogeneous explanation for how traveler inflows have changed since the 2016 election. These run counter to the general media portrayal of declining entries and do not account for other factors that are changing over time. Yet these results alone do not demonstrate that the three events had chilling effects and unintended consequences of changing travel inflows, nor do they explain why. How might these events have impacted how motivated these different nationalities were to visit the U.S., and what evidence is there that they changed such motives? Furthermore, how much did these changes in motivations vary by whether the prospective visitors or actual visitors were coming to the U.S. for business, study, tourism or family visits? What sort of data or evidence would lend support to arguments such as certain nationalities having an affinity with others, others fearing that they must enter the U.S. while they still could, and still others finding the U.S. to be a less attractive place to visit due to a desire to distinguish themselves?

V. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS OF STUDY, DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

For decades, apart from its status as the leading country in immigration in the world, the U.S. has also, for many foreigners, been the second-most popular tourist destination behind France.⁶⁸ Since World War II, the U.S. is also one of the most attractive countries in which to invest, do business with, or undertake a risky enterprise; the premier country in which to pursue higher education and research; and one of the ideal locales to train professionals and advance professions in nearly every field.⁶⁹ A recent Pew Research survey estimates that, on average, roughly half of the world's population still has a favorable view of the U.S., though this is mostly due to their high opinion of American popular culture products and to the U.S.'s past defense of civil liberties.⁷⁰ Recently, this favorable view of the U.S. has fallen due to

⁶⁵ Brazilian visitors had a negative percent change both before and after all events. South Korean visitors before and after the events had a positive annual percentage change.

⁶⁶ Japan and Spain followed this pattern in going to a slightly negative rate of change before the election to a positive rate of change afterwards, but it is not clear why. The decreased percentage change in Spaniards after the travel ban and a rapid rise after courts blocked the ban suggest that Spaniards may have felt some sense that they might be targeted like Latinos, though it is unclear what data or evidence could confirm this.

⁶⁷ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 21–22.

⁶⁸ Cf. UNITED NATIONS WORLD TOURISM ORG., INTERNATIONAL TOURISM HIGHLIGHTS 9 (2019), <https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284421152>; *Spain to Replace US as Second Most Popular Tourism Spot*, BBC (Jan. 15, 2018), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42692641> (noting the U.S. was traditionally the second-most visited country in the world).

⁶⁹ JOSEPH S. NYE JR., *SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS*, 1-25 (2004).

⁷⁰ Wike et al., *supra* note 18.

foreigners having increasingly negative views of American customs and democracy.⁷¹

My findings, however, suggest that the U.S. may not be maintaining that attractiveness in the future as much as Americans might hope.⁷² At first, many events discussed in this paper might seem to most affect very specific groups of nationals that the current executive branch is consciously trying to stop from entering the U.S., ostensibly to put the security of Americans first. Even naturalized immigrants like Iranian-Americans, who left or had parents who left Iran before or during the Iranian Revolution, may not be so concerned about such migration control policies if they do not perceive the policies as directly impacting them.⁷³

These events may have even more greatly reduced the number of visitors from countries that contribute the most revenue to the U.S., many of whom the U.S. government had not intended to discourage from visiting. This seems to track other trends in the U.S.'s reputational decline, like Spain overtaking the U.S. as the second-most popular tourist destination in the world in 2018, with a 6 percent decline of tourists coming to the U.S. in 2017 compared to 2016.⁷⁴ In addition, a study by the Institute of International Education found that both applications to colleges and enrollment in the U.S. declined by 7 percent in 2017, leading to cuts to entire programs for many public universities.⁷⁵ As fewer people visit the U.S. for both pleasure and education, its desirability as a place for business and practical training may subsequently decline in the future too.

Following such trends, social scientists and other scholars in the future could draw upon new data sources to compare how different nationalities and those with different purposes of travel have increased and decreased. My initial findings raise the possibility that the Trump administration and its policies have reduced the desirability of the U.S. as a place to visit among foreign nationals that it did not intend to exclude, like Russians, Argentines, Indians, Italians, French, Canadians, Chinese, Mexicans, British, Colombians, Swedes, Swiss, and Brazilians. The nationalities I examine represent well over two-thirds of U.S. tourist revenue and the U.S. historically has considered many of these countries political allies.⁷⁶ Many foreign students might still desire to visit the U.S. but may enter it and not leave because they fear being unable to re-enter. For example, many universities' international student offices have advised their international students not to take trips home to visit families and friends before they finish their educational programs,⁷⁷ which can last anywhere from three to ten years. Although the ban temporarily revoked more than twenty thousand visas for a few days and turned away thousands of refugees, this is a small fraction of the expected 130,771 fewer foreign nationals that visited the U.S.

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 24.

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ Spain to Replace US as Second Most Popular Tourism Spot, *supra* note 68.

⁷⁵ Stephanie Saul, *As Flow of Foreign Students Wanes, U.S. Universities Feel the Sting*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/us/international-enrollment-drop.html>.

⁷⁶ Byrnes, *supra* note 24.

⁷⁷ Dawn Rhodes & Vikki Ortiz, *Universities Advise Some Students, Scholars Not to Travel Abroad*, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:21 PM), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-higher-education-immigration-met-20170130-story.html>.

in the three months after the ban compared to the same months the year before. The number of Latin American visitors declined by an even larger magnitude than the number of Middle Eastern visitors after the three events, suggesting that the symbolic and social impact of the government's policies may be far greater than the mechanical impact of legal restrictions. Middle Easterners that came in early seem to have been prescient: the U.S. government denied 15,384 more applications for immigrant visas and 21,645 more applications for non-immigrant visas in 2018 than in 2017,⁷⁸ after the Supreme Court allowed the ban to go largely into effect in December 2017;⁷⁹ by June 2018, the Court had upheld a new version of the ban, which has become an accepted law.⁸⁰ Specifically, visitors from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen received 80 percent fewer visas during the fiscal year of October 2017 to September 2018 than during the equivalent 2016 fiscal year.⁸¹ Such trends reflect what scholars Ming Chen and Zachery New have termed "the second wall."⁸²

That so many fewer Mexicans were coming to the U.S. after the election may be related to the hostile remarks Trump made about Mexican immigrants from the day he announced his candidacy,⁸³ the very low opinion Mexicans hold of Trump in Pew opinion polls,⁸⁴ and Trump's campaign platform item of building a wall.⁸⁵ Yet the media had publicized Trump's views for a full sixteen months before the fall of Mexican visitors that followed the election.⁸⁶ Mexicans may have visited the U.S. despite the xenophobic signals sent from the executive branch. If motivational data were available, this study could contribute to the fields of international migration, religion, race, and ethnicity, by confirming the finding that the behaviors of foreign nationalities—especially those that are non-white—are particularly vulnerable to racial, ethnic, and religious stereotyping,⁸⁷ subsequently affecting their travel behavior. Admittedly, relations between Mexico and the U.S., at both the level of their the elites and non-elites historically have always been tense. But relations have arguably become less tense and the interdependence between the two countries has increased significantly since the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement.⁸⁸ Ironically, Trump's rhetoric may have substantially reduced the number of Mexican

⁷⁸ Torbati, *supra* note 34.

⁷⁹ Liptak, *supra* note 10.

⁸⁰ See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

⁸¹ Stuart Anderson, *Muslim Travel Ban: Less Immigration And Few Waivers*, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2019, 12:05 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2019/03/11/muslim-travel-ban-less-immigration-and-few-waivers/#26ba103f27f0>.

⁸² Ming H. Chen & Zachary New, *Silence and the Second Wall*, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 549, 549 (2019).

⁸³ See, e.g., Scott, *supra* note 59. For example, Trump is quoted as saying: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. . . . [T]hey're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists." *Id.*

⁸⁴ Wike et al., *supra* note 18.

⁸⁵ See *Trump Orders Wall to Be Built on Mexico Border*, BBC (Jan. 26, 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38740717> ("Building a 2,000-mile barrier along the Mexican border was one of Mr. Trump's key pledges in the election campaign.").

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Scott, *supra* note 59.

⁸⁷ Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, *Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans*, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).

⁸⁸ See Amelia Josephson, *The Pros and Cons of NAFTA*, SMARTASSET (Jan. 8, 2020), <https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-pros-and-cons-of-nafta> (asserting that NAFTA strengthened diplomatic relations among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada).

visitors far more quickly than an expensive wall or more restrictive immigration and asylum policies ever could.

My demographic findings are suggestive but not confirmatory. They call for more qualitative ethnographic studies, in-depth interviews, and surveys to confirm changes in the extent that non-Americans felt more alienated from the U.S. over time. In terms of the annual percentage change in visitors, Westerners, such as the Canadians and the French, came in greater numbers after the travel ban than before, compared to the prior year.⁸⁹ Although people often travel for superficial and compulsory reasons, the commonly observed phenomenon of social homophily⁹⁰ and global network analyses of both migration and travel flows suggest that the average individual is likely more comfortable visiting a foreign country for which he or she feels a political or cultural affinity than one that seems relatively different.⁹¹ The U.S. has, for a long time, represented such a country for many Western visitors from countries historically considered U.S. allies, including the British, Germans, Italians, and Australians.⁹² But, due to the recent decrease in visits as compared to earlier years, this may change moving forward.

Admittedly, some foreign nationals, such as the Irish, South Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese, increased their visits in the period after the election compared to the period before, though only the South Koreans did so after the ban.⁹³ The finding that South Korean arrivals increased greatly after the election is a bit more perplexing; one possible explanation is that they did not perceive any of the discourse from Trump and his supporters to be hostile toward them specifically, and may have even hoped Trump would be more successful than his predecessors in bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula. The drastic decline in Russian visitors after the ban may likely be confounded by a number of later events, such as U.S. sanctions against Russia in March 2017⁹⁴ and subsequent cruise missile strikes on Syrian air bases,⁹⁵ which led to soured relations between the U.S. and Russia.⁹⁶

While I have demonstrated that far fewer foreigners are coming to the U.S. from some countries than others, my data and research design are limited. The U.S. National Travel and Tourism Office (“NTTO”) only releases data aggregated at the monthly level,⁹⁷ concealing much of the variation in travel flows within individual months. Also, the previously free data only contained foreign nationals grouped by twenty-one countries, and

⁸⁹ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 24.

⁹⁰ See generally Miller McPherson et al., *Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks*, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415 (2001).

⁹¹ Valentin Danchev & Mason A. Porter, *Neither Global nor Local: Heterogeneous Connectivity in Spatial Network Structures of World Migration*, 53 SOC. NETWORKS 4, 4 (2018); Michael Windzio, *The Network of Global Migration 1990–2013: Using ERGMs to Test Theories of Migration Between Countries*, 53 SOC. NETWORKS 20, 20, (2018).

⁹² Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 27.

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ E.g., Angela Dewan, *Russia Sanctions: What You Need to Know*, CNN (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:59 PM), <https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/europe/russia-sanctions-explainer/index.html>

⁹⁵ E.g., Tara Francis Chan, *The US Fired More than 118 Missiles at Syria in Coordinated Response to Suspected Chemical Weapons Attack*, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2018, 8:52 PM), <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-us-syria-strike-how-many-missiles-were-fired-2017-2018-4>.

⁹⁶ Thomas, *supra* note 16, at 27.

⁹⁷ *I-94 Arrivals: Monthly-Quarterly-Annual*, NAT'L TRAVEL & TOURISM OFF., <https://travel.trade.gov/research/monthly/arrivals/index.asp> (last visited Apr. 22, 2020) (“Monthly international visitation data are collected and reported from the National Travel and Tourism Office”).

as noted earlier, one might be concerned about the accuracy of more recent data released by the NTTO.

This study has practical implications for more than just the tourism industry. If fewer people are visiting the U.S., then those foreign nationals who once visited are likely heading to new destinations instead. The level of contact between U.S. citizens and different foreign nationals will also likely decline. This may potentially change those with whom Americans do business, and whom Americans befriend, marry, and regard as allies and enemies. This may result in U.S. citizens giving up the economic gains from receiving foreign tourists, students, and business visitors and increased intercultural understanding, which may be even more costly in the long runs than the socio-legal costs imposed on the minority of visitors that come from the seven targeted countries. Assessing and accounting for such harms upon U.S. citizens in addition to the costs to refugees and foreign nationals from the targeted countries may be a more comprehensive and politically efficacious way for members of Congress in all political parties to objectively assess the long-run costs and benefits of such xenophobic immigration doctrines and policies for their constituents and the whole U.S. In the future, such a cost-benefit analysis of such changes may provide a basis for a bipartisan agreement on whether to oppose or support such foreign policies and doctrines.

VI. CONCLUSION AND A REQUEST FOR FURTHER DATA AND THEORY ON WHY FEWER FOREIGNERS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN COMING TO THE UNITED STATES

As I have demonstrated in the summary of results from my demographic research, fewer foreigners have visited the U.S. in the period after the election, the proposal of the travel ban, and the court upholding the travel ban than in the period before, and also in the months following these events compared to the same month in the prior year before. We also observe that this varied greatly by the foreigner's country and continent of citizenship. This research contributes to the broader social science and legal literature of how sudden and unexpected changes in politics and laws that bar entry of only some nationalities may also result in decreases in entries of other foreign nationalities not targeted by those politics and policies, illustrating how such laws often have serious unintended consequences.

However, the reasons why so fewer foreigners not directly targeted by sudden change in the U.S. decided not to come is not completely clear from the demographic data alone. I offered some hypotheses from the social science literature as to why many foreigners may have been less inclined to visit the U.S. after these three events, although others may have more insight if they have more direct experience with foreigners that have changed their travel plans to come to the U.S. or even have second thoughts. Lawyers and legal scholars that have worked on such cases of those affected either directly or indirectly by the three events may offer us new ideas of why specific nationalities and foreigners with specific purposes for visiting the U.S.—like business people, students, tourists and family members—may have decided

to cancel their plans or avoid visiting the U.S. after these events. Such qualitative evidence—even if based on first-hand experience or anecdote—will help scholars of migration control and I in the future offer a stronger account behind the changes in the number of visitors to the U.S. after political and policy changes.

Even if lawyers and legal scholars have no personal accounts to share with those of us that study the impact of such restrictions on international mobility and migration, social scientists could also potentially draw upon other data sources to explain how the interest and motivations of foreigners for visiting the U.S. changed during this period. For example, scholars could draw upon M-Turk surveys or scraped tweets during this period for observational data of why individuals changed their travel plans. Such data is especially valuable due to both the poor and crude quality of the administrative data offered by the U.S. government on foreigners' purpose of travel currently available and how the U.S. government remains only willing to provide such data at a very high costs even during a period of an on-going pandemic when such data may be valuable for societies and governments to understand how effective such travel bans are or are not at limiting entries of foreigners. Nonetheless, many immigration lawyers and legal scholars may have had extensive experiences with clients that are both foreign citizens who became less inclined to visit the U.S. after the events described above. Such information and insights from lawyers and legal scholars as to why so many foreign citizens have been less willing to enter the U.S will help us better understand at how anti-mobility and anti-migration policies and politics have reduced the number of foreigners visiting the United States. Therefore, they can contribute to enriching the meaning of my findings by reaching out to me and sharing anonymized and confidential accounts of such foreign citizen acquaintances and clients.